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  1. Attitudes and ascriptions in Stalnaker models.Brian Ball - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (5):517-539.
    What role, if any, should centered possible worlds play in characterizing the attitudes? Lewis :513–543, 1979) argued that, in order to account for the phenomena of self-location :474–497, 1977, Noûs 13:3–21, 1979), the contents of the attitudes should be taken to be centered propositions. Stalnaker Assertion: New philosophical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), however, has argued that while centered worlds are needed to characterize e.g. belief states, the contents of such states should be (...)
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  • in Drift wijsgerig festival.Deva Waal (ed.) - 2014 - Drift.
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  • Logical foundations for belief representation.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
    This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems for natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because--unlike pure indicators--they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the (...)
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  • Thoughts and their ascription.Michael Devitt - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
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  • First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.
    In this paper, I present one possible way of arguing for the theory of minimal self-consciousness, namely, by an argument by elimination. Central to the argument are the following two claims: a) If a theory of consciousness cannot explain first-person self-reference, then the theory is false, and b) An anonymity theory cannot explain first-person self-reference. Consequently, the anonymity theory is false.
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  • Re-reading Anscombe on ‘I’.Robert J. Stainton - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):70-93.
    According to a ‘Straight’ reading of Elizabeth Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’, she holds a radically non-referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogous to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her conclusion. Her substantive view, rather is that if what you mean by ‘reference’ is a certain rich and recherché notion tracing to Frege, then ‘I’ is not a referring term. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be ‘bewitched by language’ into thinking that (...)
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  • First-personal self-reference and the self-as-subject☆.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):600-603.
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  • Der deskriptive glaubensbegriff.Y. Nakayama - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (1):29 - 53.
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  • Office-holder vs. office quantifiers.Charles F. Kielkopf - 1972 - Philosophia 2 (4):321-339.
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  • On knowing (or believing) that one knows (or believes).Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1970 - Synthese 21 (2):187 - 203.
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  • Kvantifikace v přirozeném jazyce (X).Michal Mráz - 2008 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 15 (2):238-246.
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