After describing the disorder of psychopathy, I examine the theories and the evidence concerning the psychopaths’ deficient moral capacities. I first examine whether or not psychopaths can pass tests of moral knowledge. Most of the evidence suggests that they can. If there is a lack of moral understanding, then it has to be due to an incapacity that affects not their declarative knowledge of moral norms, but their deeper understanding of them. I then examine two suggestions: it is their deficient (...) practical reason or their stunted emotions that are at fault. The evidence supports both explanations. I conclude with an overview of the debate concerning whether they are morally or legally responsible for their actions. (shrink)

Rape is a form of violence that causes destructive consequences to both the physical and spiritual health of women. Due to its taboo nature as well as the societal response to the victim, rape is especially harmful and results in han, a Korean concept that signifies a compressed suffering. The continual torment caused by han damages the rape victim’s spiritual health and ultimately leads to spiritual death. This article offers a definition of spiritual death and explores how the experience of (...) the violent act of rape within a rape culture constructs han. Specifically, the victims’ inability to express pain as well as assumed qualities of shame, self blame, and invisibility are examined with a focus on the societal response’s ability to provoke these qualities, further contributing to the emotional and spiritual trauma which results in a spiritual death. The possibility for multiple spiritual resurrections through various practices including the application of the traditional practice of Han-Pu-Ri, a Korean shamanistic ritual that releases han is discussed. (shrink)

My paper challenges an influential distinction between pain and suffering put forward by physician-ethicist, Eric Cassell. I argue that Cassell’s distinction is philosophically untenable because he contrasts suffering with an outdated theory of pain. In particular, Cassell focuses on one type of pain, the interpretation of nociception induced by noxious stimuli such as heat or sharp objects; yet since the late 1970s, pain scientists have rendered both nociception and noxious stimuli unnecessary for pain. I argue that this discrepancy between Cassell’s (...) distinction and pain science produces three philosophical problems for his distinction: first, he frames his distinction too generally, concentrating on only one type of pain to the neglect of others, such as neuropathy; second, it is possible that Cassell’s understanding of pain may include suffering; and third, Cassell gives examples of pain and suffering manifesting independently of each other, but it is possible that these cases may instead exemplify differences between nociceptive and non-nociceptive types of pain. Due to these problems, I conclude that Cassell’s distinction currently lacks a difference. I call for new efforts to articulate the differences, if any, between pain and suffering. (shrink)