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  1. Transparency and the KK Principle.Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):3-23.
    An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version (...)
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  • The knot of the world, subjectivity and ontology of the first person. [Spanish].Pedro García Ruiz - 2009 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 10:194-223.
    Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE Este ensayo busca mostrar la relevancia de la perspectiva de la primera persona a través de un enfoque fenomenológico. Frente a la negativa de las distintas tendencias de la filosofía de la mente analítica, las ciencias cognitivas y las neurociencias de considerar la realidad de los estados mentales como fenómenos subjetivos, se esboza una revisión de la cuestión con la finalidad de señalar la relación entre la experiencia subjetiva y una ontología (...)
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  • The haecceity theory and perspectival limitation.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):295-305.
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  • First-person belief and empirical certainty.David B. Martens - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.
    This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first- person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person. I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle theory according (...)
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