This is an empirical phenomenological inquiry into everyday experiences of daydreaming. The theoretical literature was found to be deficient in accounting for the ambiguity inherent to the phenomenon and lacking in concrete empirical descriptions. This study's phenomenological method was implemented in response to a body of natural scientific studies utilizing methods that were found to be inadequate to the task of comprehending and understanding the lived subjective experience of the phenomenon. From five subject interviews and their subsequent analysis via the (...) phenomenological method, the researcher was able to derive a general structural description of the experience of daydreaming. It was found that daydreaming is essentially the representation/enactment of a mood, the understanding of which is inseparable from the situated biographical project of the individual. As an act of consciousness it was described as a passive movement into two, distinct subject-world relationships, sustained by a directing-spectator position that is both detached and interfused with these two world relations. Details of these findings and their implications are discussed. (shrink)

The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

This paper seeks to integrate analytic philosophy and phenomenology. It does so through an approach generated, specifically, in relation to imagination and its cognitive significance. As an Introduction, some reservations about existing phenomenological approaches to imagination—in the work of Sartre and Edward S. Casey—are considered. It is argued that their introspective psychological approach needs to be qualified through a more analytic orientation that determines essence, initially, on the basis of public discourse concerning the term ‘imagination.’ Part One then articulates this (...) orientation through an ‘analytic reduction’ that identifies imagination’s essence in public discourse as thought in its quasi-sensory mode. Part Two offers a sustained phenomenological investigation of this essence, and identifies four major intrinsic features. On the basis of this, Part Three shows how imagination is implicated, centrally, in the capacity to acquire language. In Conclusion the proceeding arguments are defended against possible objections, and a final key summarizing argument is formulated to show that imagination must be regarded, also, as necessary to perception and its capacity to articulate a world. The paper ends with a few thoughts on the further potential of post-analytic phenomenology. (shrink)