The aim of this paper is to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes a convention. First, we argue that conventions have normative consequences because they always involve a form of trust and reliance. We contend that it is by reference to a moral principle impinging on these aspects (i.e. the principle of Reliability) that interpersonal obligations and rights originate from conventional regularities. Second, we argue that the system of mutual expectations presupposed by conventions is a source of agreements. Agreements stemming (...) from conventions are “tacit” in the sense that they are implicated by what agents do (or forbear from doing) and without that any communication between them is necessary. To justify this conclusion, we assume that: (1) there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of everyone’s silence as confirmatory of the others’ expectations (an epistemic assumption), and (2) the participating agents share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes (a motivational assumption). By clarifying the relation between conventions and agreements, the peculiar normativity of conventions is analyzed. (shrink)

The aim of this paper, is to provide a logical framework for reasoning about actions, agency, and powers of agents and coalitions in game-like multi-agent systems. First we define our basic Dynamic Logic of Agency ( ). Differently from other logics of individual and coalitional capability such as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) and Coalition Logic, in cooperation modalities for expressing powers of agents and coalitions are not primitive, but are defined from more basic dynamic logic operators of action and (historic) (...) necessity. We show that STIT logic can be reconstructed in . We then extend with epistemic operators, which allows us to distinguish capability and power. We finally characterize the conditions under which agents are aware of their capabilities and powers. (shrink)

Conviviality has been identified as a key concept necessary to web communities, such as digital cities, and while it has been simultaneously defined in literature as individual freedom realized in personal interdependence, rational and cooperative behavior and normative instrument, no model for conviviality has yet been proposed for computer science. In this article, we raised the question whether social intelligence design could be used to designing convivial digital cities. We first looked at digital cities and identified, from a social intelligence (...) design point of view, two main categories of digital cities: public websites and commercial websites; we also noted the experimental qualities of digital cities. Second, we analyzed the concept of conviviality for social science, multi-agent systems and intelligent interface; we showed the distinction among various kinds of use of conviviality, the positive outcomes such as social cohesion, trust and participation but also the negative aspects that emerged when conviviality became an instrument of power relations. Fourth, we looked at the normative aspect of conviviality as described in the literature and found that social norms for conviviality paralleled legal and institutional norms for digital cities. Finally, as a first step toward obtaining measures for conviviality, we presented a case study describing agents and user’s interactions using dependence graphs. We also presented an analysis of conviviality requirements and described our plan and methodology for designing convivial digital cities. (shrink)

Aim of the present paper is to provide a formal characterization of various different notions of responsibility within groups of agents (Who did that? Who gets the blame? Who is accountable for that? etc.). To pursue this aim, the papers proposes an organic analysis of organized collective agency by tackling the issues of organizational structure, role enactment, organizational activities, task-division and task-allocation. The result consists in a semantic framework based on dynamic logic in which all these concepts can be represented (...) and in which various notions of responsibility find a formalization. The background motivation of the work consists in those responsibility-related issues which are of particular interest for the theory and development of multi-agent systems. (shrink)

There has been an increased focus within the AI ethics literature on questions of power, reflected in the ideal of accountability supported by many Responsible AI guidelines. While this recent debate points towards the power asymmetry between those who shape AI systems and those affected by them, the literature lacks normative grounding and misses conceptual clarity on how these power dynamics take shape. In this paper, I develop a workable conceptualization of said power dynamics according to Cristiano Castelfranchi’s conceptual framework (...) of power and argue that end-users depend on a system’s developers and users, because end-users rely on these systems to satisfy their goals, constituting a power asymmetry between developers, users and end-users. I ground my analysis in the neo-republican moral wrong of domination, drawing attention to legitimacy concerns of the power-dependence relation following from the current lack of accountability mechanisms. I illustrate my claims on the basis of a risk-prediction machine learning system, and propose institutional and project-specific solutions to mitigate domination. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new model for the requirements analysis of a system. This is a new model based on the multiagent systems paradigm with the aim to support the requirements analysis phase of systems design. This model offers a structured approach to requirements analysis, based on conceptual models defined following a visual modeling language, called dependence networks. The main elements of this visual language are the agents with their goals, capabilities and facts, similarly to the TROPOS methodology (...) [11]. The normative component is present both in the ontology and in the conceptual metamodel, associating agents to roles they play inside the system and a set of goals, capabilities and facts proper of these roles. This improvement allows to define different types of dependence networks, called dynamic dependence networks and conditional dependence networks, representing the different phases of the requirements analysis of the system. This paper presents a requirements analysis model based on normative concepts such as obligation and institution. Our model is a model of semiformal specification featured by an ontology, a meta-model, a graphical notation and a set of constraints. Our model, moreover, allows the definition of the notion of coalition for the different kinds of network. (shrink)