The Cambridge Platonists were a group of religious thinkers who attended and taught at Cambridge from the 1640s until the 1660s. The four most important of them were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. The most prominent sentimentalist moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment – Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith – knew of the works of the Cambridge Platonists. But the Scottish sentimentalists typically referred to the Cambridge Platonists only briefly and in passing. The surface of Hutcheson, (...) Hume, and Smith's texts can give the impression that the Cambridge Platonists were fairly distant intellectual relatives of the Scottish sentimentalists – great great-uncles, perhaps, and uncles of a decidedly foreign ilk. But this surface appearance is deceiving. There were deeply significant philosophical connections between the Cambridge Platonists and the Scottish sentimentalists, even if the Scottish sentimentalists themselves did not always make it perfectly explicit. (shrink)

_An exploration of philosophical and religious ideas about humor in modern philosophy and their secular implications._.

Shaftesbury's philosophy combined a powerfully teleological approach, according to which all things are part of a harmonious cosmic order, with sharp observations of human nature (see section 2 below). Shaftesbury is often credited with originating the moral sense theory, although his own views of virtue are a mixture of rationalism and sentimentalism (section 3). While he argued that virtue leads to happiness (section 4), Shaftesbury was a fierce opponent of psychological and ethical egoism (section 5) and of the egoistic social (...) contract theory of Hobbes (section 6). Shaftesbury advanced a view of aesthetic judgment that was non-egoistic and objectivist, in that he thought that correct aesthetic judgment was disinterested and reflected accurately the harmonious cosmic order (section 7). Shaftesbury's belief in an harmonious cosmic order also dominated his view of religion, which was based on the idea that the universe clearly exhibits signs of perfect divine design (section 8). According to Shaftesbury, the ultimate end of religion, as well as of virtue, beauty, and philosophical understanding (all of which are turn out to be one and the same thing), is to identify completely with the universal system of which one is a part. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Cambridge Platonists had stronger philosophical links to Scottish moral philosophy than the received history allows. Building on the work of Michael Gill who has demonstrated links between ethical thought of More, Cudworth and Smith and moral sentimentalism, I outline some links between the Cambridge Platonists and Scottish thinkers in both the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century. I then discuss Hume's knowledge of Cudworth, in Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, The (...) Natural History of Religion and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to offer a new theory of humor that takes seriously both the universality and power of humor in culture. In the first chapter, I summarize historical and contemporary theories, and show how each either 1) fails to give any definition of humor, 2) fails as a theory of humor, and/or 3) underappreciates, dismisses, or does not consider the power of humor in experience. The second chapter explains the failures of prior theories by understanding the (...) problem in terms of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. These forms of culture are perspectives through which we express and understand our world, and each presents its own unique perspectives through which we can understand ourselves and the world. In the third chapter, I argue that humor is one of these necessary and universal symbolic forms of culture. I argue that confusions in the philosophy of humor stem from approaches to humor that understand it as part of some other symbolic form rather than as a form itself. In the fourth chapter, I argue for the function of humor as that which reveals and exposes epistemic vices –laziness, arrogance, and closed-minded thinking about ourselves and the world. I support this argument by showing not only that all previous theories of humor have within them epistemic revelation as a consistent commonality, but also by showing that this revelation is necessary to the form of humor while it is, at best, accidental to other forms. In my final chapter, I suggest that we ought to approach humor objectively, and that the normativity of the symbolic forms guides us toward such an approach. I offer two objective questions to ask about a given instance of humor: 1) does the humor idealize a liberated end? and 2) does the humor fulfil the cultural function of the symbolic form it represents by disrupting epistemically vicious thinking? If the answer to both of these questions is affirmative, then it is likely that the humor in question is morally praiseworthy. I conclude by offering suggestions for further study. (shrink)

Addison's landscape discussion in the famous 1712 Spectator essay on the pleasures of the imagination has often been regarded as the beginning of modern aesthetics. To see how this is the case but not in the way of conventional interpretations, it is important to remember the then revolutionary idea of “beauty without order” which Sir William Temple first discussed via the asymmetrical Chinese gardening style and which Addison enthusiastically endorsed in his horticultural reform agenda. Much more than the notions of (...) beauty, greatness, and uncommonness which are the ostensible focus and usually noticed content of his essay and which are all derived from classical European aesthetics, it is this new and unusual love of things in their seeming irregularity and disorder, and the associated belief in their capability to work themselves out, that retrospectively seems to constitute Addison's most important contribution to English and European Romanticism. (shrink)

Scholars of Shaftesbury generally consider his notion of disinterestedness as the beginning of modern aesthetics while connecting it questionably with a view of modernity as defined in terms of the segregation of truth, beauty, and goodness. To read Shaftesbury differently, it is necessary to look into the textual circumstances of his key aesthetic ideas. In particular, it is important to recognize his implicit use of Sir William Temple's discussion of the Chinese garden immediately before the few justly famous passages about (...) the beauty of the ocean, the vale, and the fruit trees and about the free and spontaneous response of the human character which constitutes the aesthetic experience. As well as a useful illumination for his new understanding of disinterestedness, this unusual involvement of a radically different artistic and philosophical tradition may also be his momentary revelation and acknowledgement of an otherwise hidden metaphysical inspiration for his revolutionary aesthetics. (shrink)

The article investigates Cassirer's developing interest in the cultural sciences to display how his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms constitutes a philosophy of culture. The core concept in such a philosophy of culture is the symbolic formation that both possesses a structured-structuring dimension and appears as an historical process in which culture shows itself as a temporal creation. The philosophy of culture displays 'life in meaning', that is reality as it exhibits human reality manifested in and through the medium of linguistic, (...) artistic, religious, scientific "and so on" action and behaviour. This reality, therefore, is mediation between culture and nature through human spirit. Cassirer's philosophy of culture connects back to Kant's transcendental idealism by emphasizing that any concept of reality establishes itself through a modalization of reality, e.g. that reality constitutes itself in the mode of interpretation. This makes the basis for Cassirer's characteristic understanding of hermeneutics where cultural development is regarded as drama. (shrink)

The problem of evil has recently gained renewed attention. As before, what is so mind-boggling is not just the horrific aggression of man against man but the fact of offenders not easily being demonized into new versions of Iago or Macbeth. Somehow, what Hannah Arendt terms “the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil” has to be dealt with, but the very effort to do so can be problematic if the idea of original sin is somehow resurrected. To examine the issue beyond (...) the conventional framework of Christian-Platonism, it is important to remember the wider international context of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when the matter first came up for discussion and when the philosophical and religious ideas received from the Far East provided for it a provocatively different frame of reference. (shrink)

In the early eighteenth century, English landscaping noticeably shifted its model from the regularity of art to the irregularity of nature. Even though this stylistic change contradicted the most elementary principles of the classical European aesthetic tradition, its proponents almost perversely cited ancient European writers in its support and justification. To understand the peculiar promotion of the new as the old in the English landscaping revolution, the involved history should be studied in a larger international and cross-cultural context than Europe. (...) This larger context, I argue, will disclose an intricate assimilation of the new into the old, a process which enabled the early English garden reformers to change the reading of tradition and to gain legitimacy for their otherwise potentially unacceptable ?beauty without order.? (shrink)

The present dissertation focuses on the examination of the methods of natural inquiry during the sixteenth-century. The historico-epistemological analysis of the different methodologies, which naturalists used to read the book of nature, shows that natural history, medicine, and alchemy were closely interconnected during the sixteenth-century. How did the naturalist thinkers justify and validate their knowledge? The present dissertation answers this question by means of two relevant historical examples of the pharmaceutical domain: Maranta’s theriac and Imperato’s philosophical medicine. They both show (...) the way in which experience and authority actually interacted within the naturalistic discourse of the sixteenth-century. In other words, the dissertation shows how experience aided naturalist philosophers to interpret correctly authorities and vice versa; more importantly, it shows under which circumstances experience could dethrone authority. In this manner, one can understand how the methods of natural inquiry justify and validate the pharmaceutical agenda of the sixteenth-century. (shrink)