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  1. The internal conversation: a personal relations theory perspective.Graham Clarke - 2008 - Journal of Critical Realism 7 (1):57-82.
    I compare Margaret Archer's model of agency and the internal conversation with personal relations theory and some recent work by Marcia Cavell. In §1, I conclude that the forms of reflexivity and associated stances towards society that Archer defines can be seen as developments of the different forms of attachment, which personal relations theory can account for. This raises questions about the relationship between attachment-based notions of psychological health and reflexivity-based approaches to social transformation. I suggest a way in which (...)
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  • Transparência, reflexão e vicissitude.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 52 (123):213-236.
    This article discusses the notion of transparency condition proposed by Richard Moran in Authority and Estrangement (2001). According to this notion the question in the first-person present tense about our own belief ("Do I believe in p?") is answered in reference with the same reasons that justify the answer to a corresponding question about the world (about the truth of p). Transparency, in this sense, is the fundamental characteristic of self-knowledge in the context of common experience. Understanding this idea helps (...)
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  • Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity.Sarah Pawlett Jackson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2365-2382.
    In this paper I argue that there are gestalt principles underlying intersubjective interactions and that this means that intersubjective ‘units’, can be recognised as unified gestalt wholes. The nub of the claim is that interactions within a ‘plural subject’ can be perceived by others outside this plural subject. Framed from the first-person perspective: I am able to recognise intersubjective interactions between multiple others who are not me. I argue that the terminology of gestalt structures is helpful in framing and understanding (...)
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  • On knowing one's own resistant beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.
    Influential views on self-knowledge presuppose that we cannot come to know a resistant belief in a first-personal way. Two theses support this supposition: if a belief self-ascription is grounded in the evidence of the person holding the belief, it is third-personal and we cannot have first-personal knowledge of beliefs we do not control. I object to both of these theses and argue that we can introspect on beliefs of which we lack control even though we cannot assent to their content.
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