La philosophie européenne est souvent critiquée comme une manière dépassée de penser et est taxée d’individualiste, d’anthropocentrique et d’euro-centrique. Plusieurs de ces approches critiques partagent la notion que la source majeure des problèmes gît dans la pensée cartésienne héritée de l’ego. Je confronte cette notion anti-cartésienne de la philosophie européenne en argumentant que la phénoménologie husserlienne offre une réinterprétation robuste et viable de l’ego cartésien, une réinterprétation qui échappe aux impasses kantiennes du formalisme et de l’intellectualisme. Suivant l’analyse de Husserl (...) et de Merleau-Ponty, je montre que le moi qui constitue le sens du monde n’est ni seulement une forme de représentations ni un solus ipse. Plutôt que d’être une forme statique ou un agent solitaire, le moi formateur du sens est une formation dynamique doté d’une structure interne et de relations génératives avec autres ego similaires. (shrink)

While it seems obvious that the embodied self is both a subject of experience and an object in the world, it is not clear how, or even whether, both of these senses of self can refer to thesameself. According to Husserl, the relation between these two senses of self is beset by the “paradox of human subjectivity.” Following Husserl’s lead, scholars have attempted to resolve the paradox of subjectivity. This paper categorizes the different formulations of the paradox according to the (...) dimension each pertains to and considers the prospects of each proposed resolution. It will be shown that, contrary to the claims of the respective authors, their attempted resolutions do not really resolve the paradox, but instead rephrase it or push it to the next dimension. This suggests that there is something deeper at work than a mere misunderstanding. This paper does not aim to resolve the paradox but instead initiates a new approach to it. Instead of seeing the paradox as a misapprehension that needs to be removed, I dig deeper to reveal its roots in ordinary consciousness. Investigating the proposed resolutions will reveal the fundamental role of the natural attitude, and I will argue that already the general thesis of the natural attitude makes the decisive cut that leads to what Sartre calls a “fissure” in pre-reflective self-awareness. The phenomenological reduction deepens the cut into what Husserl calls the “split of the self,” which in turn engenders the paradox of subjectivity. The paradox’s roots in the structure of ordinary consciousness not only constitute a reason for its persistence, but also suggest a new way to further investigate the embodied self. (shrink)