IntroductionThe main objective of my paper is to argue that Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is Cartesian in four important respects, viz. its point of departure, consciousness, freedom and dualism. Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is Cartesian insofar as it begins its inquiry into human existence by taking the Cartesian cogito as its stating point. Sartrean consciousness with its essential character of intentionality is Cartesian since it has moorings in Descartes’ conception of the mind the essential nature of which is self-isolation or self-detachment. Sartrean (...) freedom with its nihilating or negating structure has its basis in the Cartesian thesis that the human mind is basically skeptical and secretes nothingness in questioning itself and the world. And, the gaping divide between the Sartrean being-for-itself and being-in-itself has its roots in the insurmountable Cartesian dualism of the two substances, the mind and the body.Materials and MethodsThe seminal/original points discussed in the paper are: Sartre adopted the Cartesian substantial cogito by transforming it into a phenomenological subjectivity which is non-substantial; he gave a phenomenological turn to the Cartesian idea that the mind is of the nature of self-isolation; Sartre gave an ontological status to the Cartesian conception that human reality secretes nothingness by treating it as the inner structure of consciousness, the being of freedom; and Sartrean dualism is more incorrigible than the Cartesian, for Sartre has introduced “non-being,” the impassable empty distance, between consciousness and its object.Conclusion Sartre remains to be a redoubtable dualist despite his claim to the contrary that he overcame all the traditional dualisms through his conception of the monism of the phenomenon; in this, Sartre has taken a metaphysical stance, if not mystical, which is antithetical to phenomenology; and he sustained the dualism in his own inimitable, subtle way to construct an ontology implying division and conflict as the fundamental modes of human existence, the idea having implications for sociopolitical action. The paper brings out all these points under the Section, ‘Cartesian Moorings’ by taking as the background the foregoing analytical discussion of the four constituents of Sartre’s phenomenology, namely, Being, Nothing, Consciousness and Freedom. (shrink)

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, (...) be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind. (shrink)

Paradigmatically led by existential phenomenological premises, as formulated by Jean-Paul Sartre and Edmund Husserl specifically, this paper aims at a deconstruction of the value of psychiatric labelling in terms of the implications of such labelling for the labelled individual’s experience of freedom as a conscious imperative. This work has as its intention the destabilisation of labelling as a stubborn and inexorable mechanism for social propriety and regularity, which in its unyielding classificatory brandings is Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 2, (...) Edition 1, April 2002. (shrink)

One of the characteristic features of Sartre’s philosophical writing, especially in Being and Nothingness, is his use of extended narrative vignettes that immediately resound with the reader’s own experience yet are intended to illustrate, perhaps also to support, complex and controversial claims about the structures of conscious experience and the shape of the human condition. Among the best known are his description of Parisian café waiters, who somehow contrive to caricature themselves, and his analysis of feeling shame upon being caught (...) spying through a keyhole. Commentators disgaree over what these two examples are intended to convey and how they relate to one another. My aim here is to defend and enrich the interpretation of these vignettes and their associated theories that I offer in my book, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. On this reading, the waiter should be understood, as he usually is, as as an example of bad faith, but this discussion of bad faith is much more significant than has generally been recognised. We should read the later discussion of shame and interpersonal relations within this framework of bad faith. Sartre describes two aspects of shame: the revelation of the existence of what Sartre calls ‘the Other’, a perspective on the world other than my own; and the ascription to another person of a particular kind of attitude towards me. This second aspect presupposes the first, but is not essential to shame. It is simply the way we experience other people within the project of bad faith. (shrink)

This paper compares the treatment of other minds in Strawson and Sartre. Both discussions are presented here as transcendental arguments, and some striking parallels between them are brought out. However the primary significance of the alignment lies in the difference that emerges between two forms of transcendental proof, with the phenomenological treatment in Sartre promising to yield a stronger conclusion than Strawson's argument. The paper goes some way towards bringing out this difference.

Sartre’s memoir Words turns on his mid-life realisation that, although he had abandoned belief in God, he had hitherto based his work on a religious model. From this point God no longer appears as a primary reference in his writings. This is in sharp contrast with the pervasive presence of God in earlier works, especially in his ontology and related reflections on ethics. In ontology Sartre was particularly concerned with the Cartesian idea of the creator God as ens causa sui. (...) Adapting this to his own system, he uses the idea of causa sui to mark the absolute (but non-substantial) existence of for-itself being (consciousness) as separate from the uncreated plenitude of in-itself being. He then argues that the idea of God as a consciousness that founds its own being is an impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself. The idea nonetheless remains fundamental for consciousness, for desire, which arises in response to lack, ultimately the lack of in-itself being, reflects an original choice that leads to constant striving towards the impossible goal of being God. This theme haunts the ontology from beginning to end. Sartre offers a system to rival Descartes or Leibniz, but adopts a quasi-religious framework of salvation in which, apart from the promise of a possible escape from ontological destiny, human beings are condemned to futility. In ethics he explores the idea of conversion from original choice to an authentic choice of freedom, but fails to break out of the closed framework set by the ontology. (shrink)