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  1. Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...)
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  • Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Ways to Skin the Zombie Cat: A Look at the Problems Associated with Chalmers's Zombie-Argument.Walter Scott Clifton - unknown
    In contemporary philosophy of mind, the issue of consciousness has taken center stage. Broadly speaking, those who deal with consciousness fall into two camps: those who prioritize empirical work and those who favor conceptual investigation. One prominent argument has served to deepen the divide: the argument for the possibility of zombies. In this paper I intend to examine closely this argument, as it’s presented by David Chalmers, and some of the attempts to discredit it. In so doing, I present some (...)
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  • Neural decoding, the Atlantis machine, and zombies.Rosa Cao & Jared Warren - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):69-89.
    Neural decoding studies seem to show that the “private” experiences of others are more accessible than philosophers have traditionally believed. While these studies have many limitations, they do demonstrate that by capturing patterns in brain activity, we can discover a great deal about what a subject is experiencing. We present a thought experiment about a super-decoder — the Atlantis machine — and argue that given plausible assumptions, an Atlantis machine could one day be built. On the basis of this argument, (...)
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  • Dennett and Chalmers: arguments and intuition.Gustavo Leal-Toledo - 2006 - Trans/Form/Ação 29 (2):123-132.
    Chalmers and Dennett are at opposite sides of the debate on the problem of conciousness. For Chalmres, conciousness is an unquestionable fact that cannot be explained by something else. For Dennett, what exists is really multiple judgements about our conciousness. Each author accuses the other of circularity. This is only possible because the difference between the two theories is actually a difference of principles. The same opposition that we find in their theoretical apparatus we also find on their more fundamental (...)
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  • Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
    In its recent history, the philosophy of mind has come to resemble an entry into the genre of Hammer horror or pulpy science fiction. These days it is unusual to encounter a major philosophical work on the mind that is not populated with bats, homunculi, swamp-creatures, cruelly imprisoned genius scientists, aliens, cyborgs, other-worldly twins, self-aware Computer programs, Frankenstein-monster-like ‘Blockheads,’ or zombies. The purpose of this paper is to review the role in the philosophy of mind of one of these fantastic (...)
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  • Dennett e Chalmers: argumentos e intuição.Gustavo Leal-Toledo - 2006 - Trans/Form/Ação 29 (2):123-132.
    Chalmers e Dennett se encontram em lados opostos da discussão do problema da consciência. Para Chalmers, ela é um dado indubitável que não pode ser explicada em termos de outra coisa. Para Dennett, o que existe verdadeiramente são múltiplos julgamentos sobre nossa consciência. Cada um acusa o outro de circularidade. Isto só é possível porque a diferença entre estas duas teorias é verdadeiramente uma diferença de princípios. A mesma oposição que encontramos no aparato teórico encontramos também em suas pressuposições mais (...)
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