Examines Hegel’s unique understanding and assessment of capitalism as an economic, social, and cultural phenomenon.

Although Hegel is increasingly recognized as an important figure in the history of political economy, his economic views are never strictly economic. In contrast to other modern thinkers, his primary concern is not the economic efficacy of different practices or institutions but the extent to which they enable and promote the development of human freedom. In this article, I argue that Hegel's pioneering critique of modern liberal economy plays out simultaneously at a more empirical level, corresponding to the properly economic (...) dimension of his analysis, and at a deeper, logical level, which grounds and guides his position. Moreover, I argue that the tendency to favour the first of these levels, found in most of the literature on Hegel's economic thought, reduces the Philosophy of Right's main argument to a more or less vigorous plea for economic interventionism. Against this kind of reading, I show that a renewed focus on the text's logical structure reveals a different and more radical philosophical proposition, which has yet to be fully acknowledged. In particular, I argue that Hegel's dialectical logic leads him beyond the liberalism‐interventionism debate, towards a qualitatively different conception of social and economic relations. (shrink)

In Modernism as a Philosophical Problem Robert Pippin offers an interpretation of post-Kantian continental philosophy that locates the project of autonomy or self-determination at the center of the modernity/postmodernity debate and presents Hegel as a kind of radical, post-Kantian modernist, whose philosophical "experiment" is preferable to more recent attempts to overcome or deconstruct metaphysics. I raise some questions about the adequacy of Pippin's interpretation of Hegel's notion of a rational justification, at least as it bears on his argument in the (...) Philosophy of Right, and I express some reservations about Pippin's own attempt to view modernity in terms of the project of autonomy. I conclude with some reasons for preferring Habermas's account of modernity which, without abandoning the project of autonomy, relinquishes the idea of a self-grounding of reason and proposes a more modest role for philosophy within the current division of intellectual labor. (shrink)

O presente artigo discute a teoria hegeliana da sociedade civil dentro de um quadro atual, tendo em vista principalmente a tensão entre paixões e interesses encontrada no modelo econômico-político do capitalismo. Esse argumento será desenvolvido em dois momentos. Primeiramente, apresento a contribuição teórica de Hegel a esse debate a partir da concepção de que as paixões se ligam a um conteúdo “particular”, que somente são concebidas como “racionais” através de um processo de formação específico. Eu procuro mostrar que Hegel liga (...) essa expressão individual de preferências e o preenchimento de interesses pessoais através de uma formação da vontade institucionalmente mediada, através da qual os padrões de ação e de fins individuais são compreendidos enquanto formas inclusivas. Em um segundo momento, proponho que um quadro institucional deve promover as garantias de uma satisfação recíproca de interesses individuais, que, ao mesmo tempo, não sejam concebidos externamente aos participantes no mercado e no trabalho, mas que sejam fundamentadas a partir de uma legítimo sentimento de pertencimento social. Concluo com a proposta de uma “solidariedade institucionalizada”, que deve ser complementar à contingência do sentimento individual: essas esferas só são legitimadas normativamente quando elas – segundo o padrão da vontade livre – expressa, por um lado, o reconhecimento recíproco e a satisfação de preferências individuais, e, por outro, interesses descentrados em vista das relações sociais. (shrink)