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  1. Analyticity - An Unfinished Business in Possible World Semantics.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2006 - In .
    The goal of this paper is to consider how the notion of analyticity can be dealt with in model-theoretical terms. The standard approach to possible-world semantics allows us to define logical truth and necessity, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for.
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  • Quantifying over Possibilities.John Mackay - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):577-617.
    A person of average height would assert a truth by the conditional ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be taller than I am,’ in which an indicative clause ‘I am’ is embedded in a subjunctive conditional. By contrast, no one would assert a truth by ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be taller than I would be’ or ‘if I am seven feet tall, I am taller than I am’. These examples exemplify the fact that whether (...)
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  • A cut-free sequent system for two-dimensional modal logic, and why it matters.Greg Restall - 2012 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (11):1611-1623.
    The two-dimensional modal logic of Davies and Humberstone [3] is an important aid to our understanding the relationship between actuality, necessity and a priori knowability. I show how a cut-free hypersequent calculus for 2D modal logic not only captures the logic precisely, but may be used to address issues in the epistemology and metaphysics of our modal concepts. I will explain how the use of our concepts motivates the inference rules of the sequent calculus, and then show that the completeness (...)
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  • Is unsaying polite?Berislav Žarnić - 2011 - In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miščević & Berislav Žarnić (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Dordrecht and New York: Springer. pp. 201--224.
    This paper is divided in five sections. Section 11.1 sketches the history of the distinction between speech act with negative content and negated speech act, and gives a general dynamic interpretation for negated speech act. “Downdate semantics” for AGM contraction is introduced in Section 11.2. Relying on semantically interpreted contraction, Section 11.3 develops the dynamic semantics for constative and directive speech acts, and their external negations. The expressive completeness for the formal variants of natural language utterances, none of which is (...)
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  • Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Empirical Presuppositions.Laura Schroeter - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):391-394.
    This note argues that Laura Schroeter's [2005] critique of David Chalmers's epistemic two-dimensional semantics is not touched by a reply by Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen, and Clas Weber [2013].
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  • Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Arguments from Epistemic Misclassification.Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen & Clas Weber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):375-389.
    According to Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D), expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori, and (ii) the (...)
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  • On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo.M. J. Garcia-Encinas - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):147-164.
    This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they (...)
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  • The Metasyntactic Interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism.Gregory Bochner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):611-626.
    Robert Stalnaker contrasts two interpretations, semantic and metasemantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic interpretation, the primary intension or diagonal proposition associated with an utterance is a semantic value that the utterance has in virtue of the actual linguistic meaning of the corresponding sentence, and that primary intension is both what a competent speaker grasps and what determines different secondary intensions or horizontal propositions relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. The metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation: (...)
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  • Supervenience and Anomalism are Compatible.Oron Shagrir - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):241-266.
    I explore a Davidsonian proposal for the reconciliation of two theses. One is the supervenience of the mental on the physical, the other is the anomalism of the mental. The gist of the proposal is that supervenience and anomalism are theses about interpretation. Starting with supervenience, the claim is that it should not be understood in terms of deeper metaphysical relations, but as a constraint on the relations between the applications of physical and mental predicates. Regarding anomalism, the claim is (...)
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  • Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind.James Trafford - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):139-143.
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  • Reconsidering the Fresnel–Maxwell theory shift: how the realist can have her cake and EAT it too.Juha Saatsi - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (3):509-538.
    This paper takes another look at a case study which has featured prominently in a variety of arguments for rival realist positions. After critically reviewing the previous commentaries of the theory shift that took place in the transition from Fresnel’s ether to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of optics, it will defend a slightly different reading of this historical case study. Central to this task is the notion of explanatory approximate truth, a concept which must be carefully analysed to begin with. With (...)
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  • Against relativism. [REVIEW]Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348.
    Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.
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  • Considering empty worlds as actual.Laura Schroeter - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):331-347.
    This paper argues that David Chalmer's new epistemic interpretation of 2-D semantics faces the very same type of objection he takes to defeat earlier contextualist interpretation of the 2-D framework.
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  • Against A Priori reductions.Laura Schroeter - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586.
    According to David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, conceptual competence puts one in a position to have a priori knowledge of conditional claims of the form ‘If my environment is thus and so, then water = H2O’. The rationale for this position, I argue, rests on controversial semantic assumptions about the individuation of meanings or concepts. I sketch a new model of conceptual competence, which undermines the apriority of such conditionals.
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  • Questions & Indexicality.Thom van Gessel - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (3):593-621.
    The truth conditions of sentences with indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘here’ cannot be given directly, but only relative to a context of utterance. Something similar applies to questions: depending on the semantic framework, they are given truth conditions relative to an actual world, or support conditions instead of truth conditions. Two-dimensional semantics can capture the meaning of indexicals and shed light on notions like apriority, necessity and context-sensitivity. However, its scope is limited to statements, while indexicals also occur in questions. (...)
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