Objects: With the advent of genetic technologies, many genetic/metabolic disorders can be detected asymptomatically but might be untreatable, and the benefits and risks of screening for them are not fully known. The purpose of this study is to explore current practice with regard to the parental consent process in newborn screening .Design: Staff in 23 obstetric clinics/hospitals that conduct NBS in one city of southern Taiwan were interviewed. Using content analysis, 15 interview transcripts, eight completed questionnaires, and other relevant documents (...) from the 23 clinics/hospitals were analysed to reveal the framework of the parental consent process in NBS in southern Taiwan.Main measures: Three categories—informed consent, informed dissent, and no informed/consent—were developed to analyse the parental consent process in NBS.Results: The parental consent procedures in NBS and the quality of the information provided before obtaining consent vary widely. Because the traditional NBS was incorporated into routine paediatric practices in most clinics/hospitals, the most frequently encountered consent model is “informed dissent” and “no informed/consent” ; while an “informed consent” model is the frequent model for screening rare metabolic/genetic disorders.Conclusions: Specific guidelines to regulate the parental consent process for NBS are essential. Further studies should investigate parental responses to NBS, taking these as the basis on which to establish an informed consent model in Taiwan. (shrink)

The identification and avoidance of disease susceptibility in embryos is the most common goal of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Most jurisdictions that accept but regulate the availability of PGD restrict it to what are characterized as ‘serious’ conditions. Line-drawing around seriousness is not determined solely by the identification of a genetic mutation. Other factors seen to be relevant include: impact on health or severity of symptoms; degree of penetrance (probability of genotype being expressed as a genetic disorder); potential for therapy; (...) rate of progression; heritability; and age of onset. In the original applications of PGD, most, if not all of these factors were seen as necessary but none was seen as sufficient for determining whether a genetic condition was labelled ‘serious’. This, however, is changing as impact on health or severity of symptoms is coming to eclipse the other considerations. This paper investigates how age of onset (primarily in the context of the United Kingdom (UK)) has become considerably less significant as a criterion for determining ethically acceptable applications of PGD. Having moved off the threshold of permitting PGD testing for only fatal (or seriously debilitating), early-onset diseases, I will investigate reasons for why age of onset will not do any work to discriminate between which adult-onset diseases should be considered serious or not. First I will explain the rationale underpinning age of onset as a factor to be weighed in making determinations of seriousness. Next I will challenge the view that later-onset conditions are less serious for being later than earlier-onset conditions. The final section of the paper will discuss some of the broader disability concerns at stake in limiting access to PGD based upon determinations of the ‘seriousness’ of genetic conditions. Instead of advocating a return to limiting PGD to only early-onset conditions, I conclude that the whole enterprise of trying to draw lines of what is to count as a ‘serious’ condition is itself problematic and in certain ways morally misleading. (shrink)

Arguments against the possible use of genetic test results in private health and life insurance predominantly refer to the problem of certain gene carriers failing to obtain affordable insurance cover. However, some moral intuitions speaking against this practice seem to be more fundamental than mere concerns about adverse distributional effects. In their perspective, the central ethical problem is not that some people might fail to get insurance cover because of their ‘bad genes’, but rather that some people would manage to (...) get insurance cover because of their ‘good genes’. This paper tries to highlight the ethical background of these intuitions. Their guiding idea appears to be that, by pointing to his favourable test results, a customer might make an attempt to ‘sell his body’. The rationale of this concept is developed and its applicability to the case at issue is critically investigated. The aim is to clarify an essential objection against the use of genetic information in private insurance which has not yet been openly addressed in the academic debate of the topic. (shrink)

Background Past studies emphasized the possible cultural influence on attitudes regarding reprogenetics and reproductive risks among medical students who are taken to be “future physicians.” These studies were crafted in order to enhance the knowledge and expand the boundaries of cultural competence. Yet such studies were focused on MS from relatively marginalized cultures, namely either from non-Western developing countries or minority groups in developed countries. The current study sheds light on possible cultural influences of the dominant culture on medical students (...) in two developed countries, potentially with different dominant cultures regarding reprogenetics and reproductive risks: Israel and Croatia. Methods Quantitative-statistical analyses were employed, based on anonymous questionnaires completed by 150 first year medical students in Israel and Croatia. The questionnaires pertained to the knowledge and attitudes regarding genetics, reproduction and reproductive risks. These questionnaires were completed before the students were engaged in learning about these topics as part of the curriculum in their medical school. Results Substantial differences were revealed between the two groups of medical students. Israeli medical students were less tolerant regarding reproductive risks and more knowledgeable about genetics and reproductive risks than Croatian medical students. For example, while nearly all Israeli medical students disagreed with the idea that “Screening for reproductive risks in prospective parents is wrong,” less than 40% of their Croatian counterparts shared a similar stance. Similarly, all Israeli medical students correctly observed that “A carrier of a recessive genetic disease actually has the disease” was wrong, as opposed to only 82% of Croatian students. Conclusions By linking applicable theoretical literature to these findings, we suggest that they may reflect the hidden influence of the dominant culture in each country, disguised as part of the “culture of medicine.” Acknowledging and learning about such influence of the dominant culture, may be an important addition to the training of medical students in cultural competence, and specifically their cultural awareness. Such an acknowledgement may also pave the road to drawing the attention of existing physicians regarding a less known yet an important aspect of their cultural competence, insofar as the cultural awareness component is concerned. (shrink)