The possibility of editing the genomes of human embryos has generated significant discussion and interest as a matter of science and ethics. While it holds significant promise to prevent or treat disease, research on and potential clinical applications of human embryo editing also raise ethical, regulatory, and safety concerns. This systematic review included 223 publications to identify the ethical arguments, reasons, and concerns that have been offered for and against the editing of human embryos using CRISPR-Cas9 technology. We identified six (...) major themes: risk/harm; potential benefit; oversight; informed consent; justice, equity, and other social considerations; and eugenics. We explore these themes and provide an overview and analysis of the critical points in the current literature. (shrink)

Background Past studies emphasized the possible cultural influence on attitudes regarding reprogenetics and reproductive risks among medical students who are taken to be “future physicians.” These studies were crafted in order to enhance the knowledge and expand the boundaries of cultural competence. Yet such studies were focused on MS from relatively marginalized cultures, namely either from non-Western developing countries or minority groups in developed countries. The current study sheds light on possible cultural influences of the dominant culture on medical students (...) in two developed countries, potentially with different dominant cultures regarding reprogenetics and reproductive risks: Israel and Croatia. Methods Quantitative-statistical analyses were employed, based on anonymous questionnaires completed by 150 first year medical students in Israel and Croatia. The questionnaires pertained to the knowledge and attitudes regarding genetics, reproduction and reproductive risks. These questionnaires were completed before the students were engaged in learning about these topics as part of the curriculum in their medical school. Results Substantial differences were revealed between the two groups of medical students. Israeli medical students were less tolerant regarding reproductive risks and more knowledgeable about genetics and reproductive risks than Croatian medical students. For example, while nearly all Israeli medical students disagreed with the idea that “Screening for reproductive risks in prospective parents is wrong,” less than 40% of their Croatian counterparts shared a similar stance. Similarly, all Israeli medical students correctly observed that “A carrier of a recessive genetic disease actually has the disease” was wrong, as opposed to only 82% of Croatian students. Conclusions By linking applicable theoretical literature to these findings, we suggest that they may reflect the hidden influence of the dominant culture in each country, disguised as part of the “culture of medicine.” Acknowledging and learning about such influence of the dominant culture, may be an important addition to the training of medical students in cultural competence, and specifically their cultural awareness. Such an acknowledgement may also pave the road to drawing the attention of existing physicians regarding a less known yet an important aspect of their cultural competence, insofar as the cultural awareness component is concerned. (shrink)

Arguments against the possible use of genetic test results in private health and life insurance predominantly refer to the problem of certain gene carriers failing to obtain affordable insurance cover. However, some moral intuitions speaking against this practice seem to be more fundamental than mere concerns about adverse distributional effects. In their perspective, the central ethical problem is not that some people might fail to get insurance cover because of their ‘bad genes’, but rather that some people would manage to (...) get insurance cover because of their ‘good genes’. This paper tries to highlight the ethical background of these intuitions. Their guiding idea appears to be that, by pointing to his favourable test results, a customer might make an attempt to ‘sell his body’. The rationale of this concept is developed and its applicability to the case at issue is critically investigated. The aim is to clarify an essential objection against the use of genetic information in private insurance which has not yet been openly addressed in the academic debate of the topic. (shrink)

Many different professionals play a key role in maintaining welfare in a welfare society. These professionals engage in moral judgements when using (new) technologies. In doing so, they achieve that radical responsibility towards the other that Levinas describes as being at the very core of ethics. Also, professionals try to assess the possible consequences of the involvement of specific technologies and adjust their actions in order to ensure ethical responsibility. Thus, ethics is necessary in order to obtain and sustain one's (...) professionalism. This presents care institutions with the challenge to design work processes and technology work in ways that include a sense of ‘the Other’ and make moral judgement an indispensable part of professional competence in technology. This article provides new understandings of the way ethics are involved in care institutions. Nurses’ moral judgements are sophisticated with regard to ethical perspectives. In hospitals, nurses combine Latour's notion of symmetry in human/technology relations with an ethics implying ethical priority to human beings over other beings. This combination of ethics is not only sophisticated; it is also paradoxical, as it puts together mutually contradictory ethics. Instead of causing moral confusion, this ethical paradox is employed to produce a particularly refined notion of care situations, allowing nurses’ care to include patients and technology alike. (shrink)

The identification and avoidance of disease susceptibility in embryos is the most common goal of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Most jurisdictions that accept but regulate the availability of PGD restrict it to what are characterized as ‘serious’ conditions. Line-drawing around seriousness is not determined solely by the identification of a genetic mutation. Other factors seen to be relevant include: impact on health or severity of symptoms; degree of penetrance (probability of genotype being expressed as a genetic disorder); potential for therapy; (...) rate of progression; heritability; and age of onset. In the original applications of PGD, most, if not all of these factors were seen as necessary but none was seen as sufficient for determining whether a genetic condition was labelled ‘serious’. This, however, is changing as impact on health or severity of symptoms is coming to eclipse the other considerations. This paper investigates how age of onset (primarily in the context of the United Kingdom (UK)) has become considerably less significant as a criterion for determining ethically acceptable applications of PGD. Having moved off the threshold of permitting PGD testing for only fatal (or seriously debilitating), early-onset diseases, I will investigate reasons for why age of onset will not do any work to discriminate between which adult-onset diseases should be considered serious or not. First I will explain the rationale underpinning age of onset as a factor to be weighed in making determinations of seriousness. Next I will challenge the view that later-onset conditions are less serious for being later than earlier-onset conditions. The final section of the paper will discuss some of the broader disability concerns at stake in limiting access to PGD based upon determinations of the ‘seriousness’ of genetic conditions. Instead of advocating a return to limiting PGD to only early-onset conditions, I conclude that the whole enterprise of trying to draw lines of what is to count as a ‘serious’ condition is itself problematic and in certain ways morally misleading. (shrink)