This article in an attempt to identify the precise way in which Robert Boyle provided a mechanical account of the features that distinguish liquids and air from solids and from each other. In his pneumatics, Boyle articulated his notion of the ‘spring’ of the air for that purpose. Pressure appeared there only in a common, rather than in a technical, sense. It was when he turned to hydrostatics that Boyle found the need to introduce a technical sense of pressure to (...) capture the fluidity of water which, unlike air, lacked a significant spring. Pressure, understood as representing the state of a liquid within the body of it rather than at its surface, enabled Boyle to trace the transmission of hydrostatic forces through liquids and thereby give a mechanical account of that transmission according to his understanding of the term. This was a major step towards the technical sense of pressure that was to be adopted in Newton’s hydrostatics and in fluid mechanics thereafter. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the natural philosophical method of Geminiano Montanari, one of the most prominent Italian natural philosophers of the late seventeenth century. Montanari’s views are used as a case study to assess recent claims concerning early modern experimental philosophy. Having presented the distinctive tenets of seventeenth-century experimental philosophers, I argue that Montanari adheres to them explicitly, thoroughly, and consistently. The study of Montanari’s views supports three claims. First, experimental philosophy was not an exclusively British phenomenon. Second, in spite of (...) some portrayals of experimental philosophy as an ‘atheoretical’ or ‘purely descriptive’ enterprise, experimental philosophers could consistently endorse a variety of natural philosophical explanations and postulate theoretical entities. Third, experimental philosophy and mechanical philosophy were not, as such, antagonistic. They could be consistently combined in a single philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

This paper uses scientific perspectivism as a lens for understanding acid experiments from the Chemical Revolution. I argue that this account has several advantages over several recent interpretations of this period, interpretations that do not neatly capture some of the historical experiments on acids. The perspectival view is distinctive in that it avoids discontinuity, allows for the rational resolution of disagreement, and is sensitive to the historical epistemic context.