In recent years, scholars in the social sciences and humanities have turned their attention to how the rise of digital technologies is reshaping political life in contemporary society. Here, we analyze this issue by distinguishing between two classification technologies typical of pre-digital and digital eras that differently constitute the relationship between individuals and groups. In class-based systems, characteristic of the pre-digital era, one’s status as an individual is gained through membership in a group in which salient social identities are shared (...) in common with other group members. In attribute-based systems, characteristic of the digital era, one’s status as an individual is determined by virtue of possession of a set of attributes that need not be shared with others. We argue that differences between these two types of classification technologies have important implications for how persons attach (or fail to attach) to groups, and therefore what kinds of political mobilization are possible. We illustrate this argument by examining contention over the use of gender as a variable in the pricing of risk in insurance and credit – two markets in which individuals directly encounter class-based and attribute-based systems of classification, respectively. (shrink)

More and more, we face AI-based products and services. Using these services often requires our explicit consent, e.g., by agreeing to the services’ Terms and Conditions clause. Current advances introduce the ability of AI to evolve and change its own modus operandi over time in such a way that we cannot know, at the moment of consent, what it is in the future to which we are now agreeing. Therefore, informed consent is impossible regarding certain kinds of AI. Call this (...) the problem of radical ignorance. Interestingly, radical ignorance exists in consent contexts other than AI, where it seems that individuals can provide informed consent. The article argues that radical ignorance can undermine informed consent in some contexts but not others because, under certain institutional, autonomy-protecting conditions, consent can be valid without being (perfectly) informed. By understanding these institutional conditions, we can formulate practical solutions to foster valid, albeit imperfectly informed consent across various decision contexts and within different institutions. (shrink)

Over the last decade, ‘data scientists’ have burst into society as a novel expert role. They hold increasing responsibility for generating and analysing digitally captured human experiences. The article considers their professionalization not as a functionally necessary development but as the outcome of classification practices and struggles. The rise of data scientists is examined across their discursive classification in the academic and economic fields in both the USA and Germany. Despite notable differences across these fields and nations, the article identifies (...) two common subjectivation patterns. Firstly, data scientists are constructed as hybrids, who combine generally conflictive roles as both generalists and specialists; technicians and communicators; data exploiters and data ethicists. This finding is interpreted as demonstrating a discursive distinction between data scientists and other competing and supposedly more one-dimensional professionals, such as statisticians or computer scientists. Secondly, the article uncovers a discursive construction that interpellates data scientists as discoverers of needs. They are imagined as explorative work subjects who can establish growth for digital capitalism by generating behavioural patterns that allow for personalization, customization and optimization practices. (shrink)