This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief (...) with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true. (shrink)

This paper argues that representationalism of a Fodorian variety can accommodate the fact that beliefs come in degrees. First, it responds to two key arguments to the contrary. Second, it builds upon these responses and outlines a novel representationalist theory of degrees of beliefs. I call this theory dispositional representationalism, as it involves direct appeal to our dispositions to form representations and propositional attitudes concerning them.

The essential task of the investigation of self-deception is nothing more than establishing the boundary of it, herein known as the distinction problem of self-deception. Such a boundary is necessary for distinguishing the phenomenon of self-deception from other similar phenomena, especially wishful thinking, and sheds light on the future research of other theoretical questions posed by the phenomenon. Although philosophers have reached a vague consensus on certain necessary elements involved in the phenomenon of self-deception, there is no general agreement on (...) their details, leading to a lack of canonical literature regarding the question of what makes self-deception a unique phenomenon. In this thesis, I begin by attempting to re-establish the initial definition of self-deception by illustrating the vague consensus in the current discussion of self-deception. Then, several representative views are examined to uncover the reason for their failure to capture the distinction between self-deception and other kinds of irrationality. These findings are then used to clarify what the basic structure of self-deception should be. Finally, I develop an account revealing that the distinction problem is related to the study of the necessary attitude involved in self-deception. My analysis shows that a special kind of instability inherent in the necessary attitude involved in self-deception is the key to establishing self-deception as a distinctive case of motivated irrationality. (shrink)