Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory

Oxford University Press (1996)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A case of mind/brain identity: One small bridge for the explanatory gap.W. R. Webster - 2002 - Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Consciousness-dependence and the explanatory gap.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):521-540.
    Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Constitution and the explanatory gap.Hagit Benbaji - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):183-202.
    Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H2O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable. Mark Johnston [Journal of philosophy , 564–583] suggests that if water is constituted by H2O, not identical to it, then the explanatory gap becomes a pseudo-problem. This is because all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Understanding consciousness.Isabel Góis - 2001 - Disputatio 1 (10):3-21.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Psychological Phenomena and First-Person Perspectives: Critical Discussions of Some Arguments in Philosophy of Mind.Pär Sundström - 1999 - Uppsala, Sweden: Acta University Umensis.
    The topic of this thesis is how different phenomena, commonly regarded as "psychological" or "mental", are or can be apprehended in the first person. The aim is to show that a number of influential texts of contemporary philosophy display a particular type of oversight on this topic. The texts in question display, I argue, an insufficient appreciation of the case for holding that "non-qualitative" psychological phenomena are apprehended in an exclusive way in the first person. To make this case, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Experience, appearance, and hidden features.D. Gene Witmer - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Charles Siewert has given us an ingenious thought experiment involving a limited lack of conscious experience. The possibility of the described case is incompatible with a number of popular theories of consciousness. Siewert acknowledges, however, that this possibility is not a direct threat to "hidden feature" theories. I aim to do two things: first, strengthen his defense of the claim that the case is genuinely possible by considering and rejecting some further attempts to explain away our temptation to believe it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Who is blind to blindsight?Peter Carruthers - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    This paper uses the explanation of blindsight generated by a two-systems theory of vision in order to set Siewert a dilemma. Either his blindsight examples are modelled on actual blindsight, in which case certain reductive theories of phenomenal consciousness will have no difficulty in accommodating them. Or they are intended to be purely imaginary, in which case they will have no force against a reductive naturalist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Thinking about Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness.Robert Kirk - 2002 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind [December 4 (1).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Phenomenal consciousness so-called.Austen Clark - 2001 - In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific.
    "Consciousness" is a multiply ambiguous word, and if our goal is to explain perceptual consciousness we had better be clear about which of the many senses of the word we are endorsing when we sign on to the project. I describe some of the relatively standard distinctions made in the philosophical literature about different meanings of the word "conscious". Then I consider some of the arguments of David Chalmers and of Ned Block that states of "phenomenal consciousness" pose special and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Precis of The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6.
    The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-person warrant for judgments about one's own experience. Thought experiments are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Philosophical issues about consciousness.Ned Block - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations