This article explores hamartiological questions at the interface of evolutionary biology and theology. Such questions include the problem of evil, the possibility of a historical fall, and the meaning of human sinfulness in light of biology. First, I examine some of the leading accounts of animal theodicy, including John Schneider's aesthetic theodicy, Christopher Southgate's compound theodicy, and Joshua Moritz's free creatures’ defense. Second, I review several non‐lapsarian accounts of how sin originated within the human story (e.g., Robert Russell's concept of (...) entropy as the physical origin of sin). Then third, I discuss noteworthy attempts to revise the doctrine of original sin in light of evolutionary psychology. Although the quest for a post‐Darwinian doctrine of sin has prompted fascinating areas of research, I conclude that an evolutionary hamartiology remains a remarkably difficult project. (shrink)

This article explores hamartiological questions at the interface of evolutionary biology and theology. Such questions include the problem of evil, the possibility of a historical fall, and the meaning of human sinfulness in light of biology. First, I examine some of the leading accounts of animal theodicy, including John Schneider's aesthetic theodicy, Christopher Southgate's compound theodicy, and Joshua Moritz's free creatures’ defense. Second, I review several non‐lapsarian accounts of how sin originated within the human story (e.g., Robert Russell's concept of (...) entropy as the physical origin of sin). Then third, I discuss noteworthy attempts to revise the doctrine of original sin in light of evolutionary psychology. Although the quest for a post‐Darwinian doctrine of sin has prompted fascinating areas of research, I conclude that an evolutionary hamartiology remains a remarkably difficult project. (shrink)

I argue for the centrality of the concepts of biophysical and human nature in science-and-religion studies, consider five different metaphors, or “visions,” of nature, and explore possibilities and challenges in reconciling them. These visions include (a) evolutionary nature, built on the powerful explanatory framework of evolutionary theory; (b) emergent nature, arising from recent research in complex systems and self-organization; (c) malleable nature, indicating both the recombinant potential of biotechnology and the postmodern challenge to a fixed ontology; (d) nature as sacred, (...) a diffuse popular concept fundamental to cultural analysis; and (e) nature as culture, an admission of epistemological constructivism. These multiple visions suggest the famous story of the blind men and the elephant, in which each man made the classic mistake of part-whole substitution in believing that what he grasped (the tail, for example) represented the elephant as a whole. Indeed, given the inescapability of metaphor, we may have to admit that the ultimate truth about the “elephant” (nature, or the reality toward which science and religion point) is a mystery, and the best we can hope for is to confess the limitations of any particular vision. (shrink)

Opposition to `ownership' of cells and tissues often depends on arguments about the special or sacred nature of human bodies and other living things. Such arguments are not very helpful in dealing with the patenting of DNA fragments. Two arguments undergird support for patenting: the notion that an author has a `right' to an invention resulting from his/her labor, and the utilitarian argument that patents are needed to support medical inventiveness. The labor theory of ownership rights is subject to critique, (...) though it may still have enduring value. The more important argument is that deriving from the common good. If patents on DNA are supported on the basis of their contributions to the common good, then they can also be limited based on considerations of the common good. (shrink)