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What Have I Done?

Diametros 38:86-111 (2013)

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  1. In search of a fitting moral psychology for practical wisdom: Exploring a missing link in virtuous management.Kleio Akrivou & Germán Scalzo - 2020 - Business Ethics 29 (S1):33-44.
    While business as a social activity has involved communities of persons embedded in dense relational networks and practices for thousands of years, the modern legal, theoretical psychological, and moral foundations of business have progressively narrowed our understanding of practical wisdom. Although practical wisdom has recently regained ground in business ethics and management studies, thanks mainly to Anscombe's recovery of virtue ethics, Anscombe herself once observed that it lacks, and has even neglected, a moral psychology that genuinely complements the nuanced philosophical (...)
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  • Can double‐effect reasoning justify lethal organ donation?Adam Omelianchuk - 2022 - Bioethics 36 (6):648-654.
    The dead donor rule (DDR) prohibits retrieval protocols that would be lethal to the donor. Some argue that compliance with it can be maintained by satisfying the requirements of double‐effect reasoning (DER). If successful, one could support organ donation without reference to the definition of death while being faithful to an ethic that prohibits intentionally killing innocent human life. On the contrary, I argue that DER cannot make lethal organ donation compatible with the DDR, because there are plausible ways it (...)
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  • Considering Intentions in Decision Making: What Is So Odd about It?Anton Markoč - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (4):481-498.
    An influential objection to the view that intentions are non-derivatively relevant to the moral permissibility of actions states that if intentions were relevant to permissibility in such a way, one would have to take them into account in decision making, which would be odd (in some morally relevant sense of ‘oddness’). The paper outlines and assesses three candidates for the oddness: that considering intentions in decision making is an unordinary practice, that it is impossible or conceptually confused, and that it (...)
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