This paper chronicles the cycles of scientism and romanticism that structure the discourse on science and technology in India since 1850. However, it does not promise a detailed review of this enormous archive. On the contrary, it aspires to identify the principle concerns, the important interlocutors, the prevalent frameworks and contextualizes them socio-politically, in both their local and global embodiments. In historical time, as has been suggested elsewhere, the scientism-romanticism dialectic acquires diversified formulations. This review suggests that in post-colonial India (...) there has been an attempt to situate science within culture across this essential dichotomy. (shrink)

Nanda writes disparagingly of "Hindu" intellectuals--including those in the West - who try to produce alternative sciences often inspired by post-modernism. She is unaware that many - including Einstein and Schrödinger - fit her descriptions of such "Hindu" Western prophets "facing backward" who revolutionized science by "alternative sciences". She misreads those positions she criticizes into one anti-science conspiracy of post-modernism and Vedic science adherents. Her misconstructions are easy to spot Examples: Key citations on India are Western; her statements often ex-cathedra (...) statements. Her history is patchy, sometimes wrong. She derides social-constructionism but turns to it when she wants it. A presumed Western leftist she quotes Daniel Bell ("End of Ideology") approvingly. "Third Ways" and "Alternatives" between alleged Western liberalism and Marxism which she denounces are in the Western left agenda for nearly thirty years. She ignores key factors in India's predicament like low literacy. Nanda derides contemporary Hindu nationalism as a scavenger picking up from different sources. This "scavenging" however, is a sign of confidence, paralleling the attitude of Europeans during hte Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Although she claims that there are a few elements from the Indic tradition which are useful, she does not explore this except for Ambedkar Buddhism. Here she puts more emphasis on its alleged western roots than on Ambedkar's declared Buddhism. For her, Western modernity is one universal ignoring the many different trajectories different western societies have taken in their science development. She regrets the breaking down in comtemporary India of conventional boundaries between presumed right, left, progress and development. Instead of rewriting received Western wisdom to fit this real historical experience of India, she resorts to only Western conceptual categories. She damns both Indian social reality as well as attempts at fresh Indian conceptualization. For her, secularization means brainwashing the local populaton into an unashamed McCauleyite template illustrating deep feelings of insecurity about her own culture. (shrink)

This paper provides one of the many ways of doing historiography, specifically concerning Indian philosophy. After making some general observations on the limitations of a historian and a historiographer in general—it would provide a brief analysis of the historiography of Indian philosophy by looking at the recent attempts at periodization. The development of 'Indian philosophy' as a label to a concept, issues concerning the use of darśana for its representation, and reeking it as a space of strange intellectual landscape by (...) contemporary scholars are discussed subsequently. While using historiography implicitly as a methodological tool, an attempt is made to probe into the contemporary conception of Indian philosophy. Though it doesn’t claim to provide any determinate conclusions regarding either periodization or conceptualization of Indian philosophy, the paper emphasizes the need to probe these concerns further and the need to use a historiographical approach to such a study. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of sameness in terms of being it the classical problem of personal identity and various philosophical positions on the existence of the self as a substantive subject. I call this subject an ethical Self, which involves different notions of ego, being, substance, and personhood. The denial of the existence of a permanent self by philosophers like Hume and Buddhists does not seem justified in regard to one's identity or sameness over time. The no-self theorists do (...) not provide any strong ground for how to explain the notion of personhood and one's actions in a moral space without accepting a substantive self as a doer that continues over time. They certainly seem to have failed in establishing a logical connection between their no-self theories on the one hand and the necessity of an ethical self in their philosophical accounts on the other. Rejecting the no-self theory in defense of the self theory of personal identity, I conclude this paper with a note that sameness of a person over time is the prerequisite of morality, law, and present and future plans and that there is no harm in considering a permanent self, as Jīva of Jainism, to solve the problem of personal identity. There is also no harm in preferring the self theory over the no-self theory since the former, unlike the latter, does give a meaning to spirituality and transcendence. (shrink)

Technologies and human values both have important bearing on human life and conditions. Unfortunately, the dialogue between them has remained inadequate, at best. While the discourse on human values recognizes various kinds and layers of values, including values that are universally relevant across societies and cultures, research on the interface between values and technology has predominantly focused on technology’s interactions with society-specific values. This article is an attempt to broaden the scope of this research by specifically taking the case of (...) cremation technologies. Numerous societal, religious and universal values interplay with each other in matters related to death and the dead. Unlike other technologies, an individual can ‘use’ cremation technology only once, that too with limited control over his/her choice. Our empirical research finds that a complex interaction of multiple layers of values shapes the form and trajectory of cremation technology. Tracking the debate on the adoption of... (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to discuss the meaning of life in Indian philosophy. All Indian philosophies are philosophies of life. Indian philosophy is not merely an intellectual activity but has practical application which enables men to lead an enlightened life. Any philosophy, either Indian or Western which makes no difference to human life, is not a philosophy. The human life always strives towards freedom, duty, wisdom, well-being, etc. These are the noble values in Indian philosophy that play a (...) very vital role in shaping the meaning of life. All schools of Indian philosophy give importance to individual freedom for self-realization. Every school of Indian philosophy prescribes its way of overcoming ignorance, and thereby overcoming pain, to achieve the goal of life. Thus, every human being has to look within, understand his nature, and figure out her or his way to self-realization. The way to reach this goal includes selfless love, service to others, self-control, and self-purification. Because of their practicality, each system of Indian philosophy is as new today as it was 3000 years ago. These are the ideas which we can find in Vivekananda, Gandhi, Aurobindo, and many others. All these philosophical schools/thinkers hold that philosophy and practical life are necessarily integrated. (shrink)

This paper discusses the positions held by two opposing camps—the traditionalists and the positivists regarding the presence or absence of ethics in Indian philosophy. It subsequently offers a way ahead of the impasse where I consider some inputs inherent in the method of dialogue in pre-modern Indian philosophy for imagining an ethics of and ethics for plurality. Such an ethics, I argue, cannot be imagined without involving the category of ‘Other,’ which has otherwise remained elusive in the Indian philosophical debates. (...) The diverse nature of Indian societies demands Other-centric ethics to assess and evaluate the enduring moral crisis pervading contemporary times. (shrink)