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Gendered Failures in Extrinsic Emotional Regulation; Or, Why Telling a Woman to “Relax” or a Young Boy to “Stop Crying Like a Girl” Is Not a Good Idea

Philosophical Topics 47 (2):95-111 (2019)

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Emotional Injustice.Pismenny Arina, Eickers Gen & Jesse Prinz - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11 (6):150-176.details In this article we develop a taxonomy of emotional injustice: what occurs when the treatment of emotions is unjust, or emotions are used to treat people unjustly. After providing an overview of previous work on this topic and drawing inspiration from the more developed area of epistemic injustice, we propose working definitions of ‘emotion’, ‘injustice’, and ‘emotional injustice’. We describe seven classes of emotional injustice: Emotion Misinterpretation, Discounting, Extraction, Policing, Exploitation, Inequality, and Weaponizing. We say why it is useful to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Pathologizing Disabled and Trans Identities: How Emotions Become Marginalized.Gen Eickers - 2023 - In Shelley Tremain (ed.), _The Bloomsbury Guide to Philosophy of Disability_. London UK: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 360-379.details In recent years, an array of critical emotion theorists have emerged who call for change with respect to how emotion theory is done, how emotions are understood, and how we do emotion. In this chapter, I draw on the work that some of these authors have produced to analyze how emotional marginalization of trans and disabled identities is experienced, considering in particular how this emotional marginalization results from the long history of pathologization of trans and disabled people. The past and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Affective injustice and fundamental affective goods.Francisco Gallegos - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):185-201.details Although previous treatments of affective injustice have identified some particular types of affective injustice, the general concept of affective injustice remains unclear. This article proposes a novel articulation of this general concept, according to which affective injustice is defined as a state in which individuals or groups are deprived of “affective goods” which are owed to them. On this basis, I sketch an approach to the philosophical investigation of affective injustice that begins by establishing which affective goods are fundamental, and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations
Political anger.Myisha Cherry - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12811.details Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 2, February 2022. Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy.Sukaina Hirji - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (16).details Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us, and our anger is a protest against our perceived mistreatment. In these cases, its function is to hold the abuser accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a different form (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
How anger helps us possess reasons for action.Steven Gubka - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details I argue that anger helps us possess reasons to intervene against others. This is because fitting anger disposes us to intervene against others in light of reasons to do so. I propose that anger is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize such interventions, in much the same way that perceptual experience is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize our judgements about our environment. In this way, anger can help us possess reasons that make specific actions rational (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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