This paper explores organ donation through the perspective of Reconstructionist Confucianism. I argue that for organ donation in China to be morally permissible, public policy must conform to the norms of Confucian benevolence. Reconstructionist Confucianism appreciates benevolence as an objectively important feature of morality deeply connected to moral rules governing propriety, integrity, righteousness, and human freedom. Here, benevolence involves sincere affection for another as an intrinsic good, rather than as a means to achieve other purposes. It requires developing self-restraint and (...) proper respect for others. As I argue, family-based consent is essential for ensuring that organ donation conforms to such an understanding of benevolence and is, thereby, compatible with Confucian culture. Consequently, legislation in China should solidify family-based consent for organ donation to consolidate a benevolent family environment as the basis of morality, law, and social existence. (shrink)

In most, if not all, jurisdictions with active organ transplantation programs, there is a persistent desire to increase donation rates because the demand for transplantable organs exceeds the supply. China, in particular, faces an extraordinary gap between the number of organs donated by deceased donors and the number of people seeking one or more transplants. China might look to Western countries with higher donation rates to determine how best to introduce Western practices into the Chinese system. In attempting to increase (...) its organ donation rate, China must not only ensure that its organ donation system reflects different Chinese cultural values, but also that it avoids the ethical problems of the United States and of other Western systems. This article examines four such problems. They concern the family, obtaining permission for organ donation, the definition and diagnosis of “brain death,” and trust. Revisions to the Chinese system should involve a careful look to China and Chinese cultural resources rather than to Western models. (shrink)

Assent to medical research or treatment may be an intuitively attractive way to address the area between incapacity and capacity that might otherwise be subject to a best interests assessment. Assent has become a widely disseminated concept in law, research, and clinical ethics, but little conceptual work on assent has so far occurred. An exploration of use of assent in treatment and research in children and people with dementia suggests that at least five claims are made on behalf of assent. (...) Since at least some of these may lead to tensions with others, assent requires firmer conceptual underpinning. Whether assent remains primarily a local approach to research in children in the United States, where it appears to fit with legal background conditions, or develops its promise to overturn the dominant, binary, approach to (in)capacity will depend on the strength of future philosophical work to improve the theoretical foundations to assent. (shrink)

Organ procurement policy from the recently deceased recasts families into gatekeepers of a scarce medical resource. To the frustration of organ procurement teams, families do not always authorize organ donation. As a result, efforts to increase the number of organs available for transplantation often seek to limit the authority of families to refuse organ retrieval. For example, in some locales if a deceased family member has satisfied the legal conditions for first-person prior assent, a much looser and easier standard to (...) satisfy than informed consent, organ retrieval may proceed despite the family’s objections. Some countries have replaced voluntary consent to organ donation with forms of organ conscription. Often referred to under the misnomer “presumed consent,” such policies legalize the harvesting of organs at death, unless individuals exercise official options to opt out. As this article explores, however, there are good grounds for affirming the authority of the family to consent to or to deny organ donation on behalf of recently deceased family members, as well as to reject first-person assent and “presumed consent” policies of organ procurement. Insofar as individuals have failed clearly and competently to provide informed consent to organ donation, moral authorization for the use of the person and his body ought to be grounded on the foundational authority of the family, rather than the state’s supposed interests in obtaining organs for transplantation. (shrink)

How do we know that particular answers in bioethical controversies are true, or are at least getting closer to the truth? We gain insight into this question by applying Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on the nature of rationality, rational justification, and tradition. Using MacIntyre’s work and the papers in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, I propose a framework for members of particular traditions to judge whether they themselves or other traditions are getting closer to or further away (...) from the truth in particular bioethical questions. Members of different traditions—be it Confucian, Aristotelian, politically liberal, utilitarian, or something else—should look at how they and their theoretical rivals look at empirical data to address bioethical questions, the moral judgments they make, and the laws and regulations they support. Some level of agreement on these issues need not require individual traditions to eschew their foundational premises or values; recognizing the reality of moral pluralism and disagreement should not prevent us from seeing this. Neither, as MacIntyre argues, should pluralism and disagreement obscure that a necessary condition for successful rational exchange and adjudication between competing traditions is granting authority to certain norms and virtues. (shrink)