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  1. A Similarity-based Approach Of Kuhn’s No-overlap Principle And Anomalies.Dragoş Bîgu - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):330-338.
    In their book Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen reconstruct Kuhn’s account of conceptual structure and change, based on the dynamic frame model. I argue against their reconstruction of anomalies and of the no-overlap principle and propose a competing model, based on the similarity relation. First, I introduce the concept of psychological distance between objects, and then I show that the conceptual structure of a theory consists of a set of natural families, separated by (...)
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  • Cognition, Meaning and Action: Lodz-Lund Studies in Cognitive Science.Piotr Łukowski, Aleksander Gemel & Bartosz Żukowski (eds.) - 2015 - Kraków, Polska: Lodz University Press & Jagiellonian University Press.
    The book is addressed to all readers interested in cognitive science, and especially in research combining a logical analysis with psychological, linguistic and neurobiological approaches. The publication is the result of a collaboration between the Department of Cognitive Science at University of Lodz and the Department of Cognitive Science at Lund University. It is intended to provide a comprehensive presentation of the key research issues undertaken in both Departments, including considerations on meaning, natural language and reasoning, linguistic as well as (...)
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  • Transforming temporal knowledge: Conceptual change between event concepts.Xiang Chen - 2005 - Perspectives on Science 13 (1):49-73.
    : This paper offers a preliminary analysis of conceptual change between event concepts. It begins with a brief review of the major findings of cognitive studies on event knowledge. The script model proposed by Schank and Abelson was the first attempt to represent event knowledge. Subsequent cognitive studies indicated that event knowledge is organized in the form of dimensional organizations in which temporally successive actions are related causally. This paper proposes a frame representation to capture and outline the internal structure (...)
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  • (1 other version)From Features via Frames to Spaces: Modeling Scientific Conceptual Change Without Incommensurability or Aprioricity.Frank Zenker - 2014 - In T. Gamerschlag, R. Gerland, R. Osswald & W. Petersen (eds.), Frames and Concept Types: Applications in Language and Philosophy. pp. 69-89.
    The frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of (...)
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