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Brentano's nonpropositional theory of judgment

Roderick M. Chisholm

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1):91-95 (1976)

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Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):153-180.details The ontological theory of the later Franz Brentano is often referred to as ‘reism.’ But what exactly is reism, and how is it related to modern-day nominalism? In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Brentano’s reism as a specific variety of nominalism. This variety, although motivated by distinctly modern concerns about truthmakers, adopts a strategy for providing such truthmakers that is completely foreign to modern nominalism. The strategy rests on proliferation of coincident concrete particulars. For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
THE TRANSCENDENTAL METAPHYSIC OF G.F. STOUT: HIS DEFENCE AND ELABORATION OF TROPE THEORY.Fraser Macbride - 2014 - In A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, Value and Metaphysics: Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Springer. pp. 141-58.details G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Brentano on Judgment.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 103-109.details ‘Judgment’ is Brentano’s terms for any mental state liable to be true or false. This includes not only the products of conceptual thought, such as belief, but also perceptual experiences, such as seeing that the window was left open. ‘Every perception counts as a judgment,’ writes Brentano (1874: II, 50/1973a: 209). Accordingly, his theory of judgment is not exactly a theory of the same phenomenon we call today ‘judgment,’ but of a larger class of phenomena one (perhaps the main) species (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142 (4):529-548.details In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, Franz Brentano is known mostly for his thesis that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental.’ Among Brentano scholars, there are also lively debates on his theory of consciousness and his theory of judgment. Brentano’s theory of will and emotion is less widely discussed, even within the circles of Brentano scholarship. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of mind. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.details Both through his own work and that of his students, Franz Clemens Brentano had an often underappreciated influence on the course of 20 th - and 21 st -century philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ offers full coverage of Brentano’s philosophy and his influence. It contains 38 brand-new essays from an international team of experts that offer a comprehensive view of Brentano’s central research areas—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and value theory—as well as of the principal (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
First-person belief and empirical certainty.David B. Martens - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.details This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first- person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person. I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle theory according (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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