Switch to: References

Citations of:

Freedom and Thought: Stoicism, Skepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness

In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 55–71 (2009)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Unhappy Consciousness.Andrzej Wierciński - 2017 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 22 (1):65-79.
    Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a careful description of the progressive unfolding of Spirit. Its dialectic is the education of consciousness. There are three stages of unhappy consciousness: external beyond, changing individual, and achieved reconciliation. Being aware of its own mutability, the self yearns for reconciliation, which can only come from the external beyond, from the unchanging. The quest of unhappy consciousness for reconciliation is characterized by the three stages of devotion, sacramental desire and labour, and self-mortification. The self, constituted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • ‘Expression of Contempt’: Hegel’s Critique of Legal Freedom.Daniel Loick & Chad Kautzer - 2015 - Law and Critique 26 (2):189-206.
    In this paper, I argue for the existence of pathologies of juridicism. I attempt to show that the Western regime of right tends to colonize our intersubjective relations, resulting in the formation of affective and habitual dispositions that actually hinder participation in social life. Speaking of pathologies of juridicism is to claim that the legal form fundamentally contaminates the way in which we relate to ourselves, to others, and to the world, resulting in an ethically deformed, distorted or deficient form (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (4):753-99.
    : This paper explicates and defends the thesis that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification, whether in cognition or in morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. This puts paid to the traditional distinction, still influential today, between ‘rational’ and ‘historical’ knowledge. The present analysis highlights and defends key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including four fundamental features of the ‘autonomy’ of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations