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Steadfast intentions.Keith K. Niall - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):679-680.details
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Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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Phenomena and Representation.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-547.details
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The powers of machines and minds.Chris Mortensen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):678-679.details
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Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Intentionality.Alex Morgan & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):119-139.details
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Responsible choices, desert-based legal institutions, and the challenges of contemporary neuroscience.Michael S. Moore - 2012 - Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):233-279.details
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Behavior, cognition, and physiology: Three horses or two?T. R. Miles - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):68-69.details
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A mentalistic view of “Pain and behavior”.H. Merskey - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):68-68.details
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Pain and parallel processing.Ronald Melzack - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):67-68.details
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Computation and consciousness.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):676-678.details
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One pain is enough.Wallace I. Matson - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):67-67.details
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Commentary on Shields.James T. H. Martin - 1995 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 11 (1):331-340.details
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Alternative Strategies for the Analysis of Knowledge.Joseph Margolis - 1973 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):461 - 469.details
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Gödel redux.Alexis Manaster-Ramer, Walter J. Savitch & Wlodek Zadrozny - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):675-676.details
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Uncertainty about quantum mechanics.Mark S. Madsen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):674-675.details
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The discomforts of dualism.Bruce MacLennan - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):673-674.details
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Quantum AI.Rudi Lutz - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):672-673.details
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Functional behaviorism: Where the pain is does not matter.A. W. Logue - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):66-66.details
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Against dichotomizing pain.John D. Loeser - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):65-65.details
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Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty.Robert Lockie - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (2):133-149.details
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From the Naturalistic to the Transcendental Conception of Intentionality.Zhongwei Li - 2018 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 10 (1):74-87.details
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Time-delays in conscious processes.Benjamin Libet - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):672-672.details
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Is attending a mental process?Yair Levy - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (3):283-298.details
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Character, content, and the ontology of experience.Mark Leon - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):377-399.details
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Knowledge before Gettier.Pierre Le Morvan - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (6):1216-1238.details
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Intentionality: Transparent, translucent, and opaque.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.details
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On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories.Filipe Lazzeri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):405-418.details
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Pain behavior: How to define the operant.Hugh Lacey - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):64-65.details
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The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.details
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Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.details
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Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
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Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142 (4):529-548.details
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Chronic sensory pain.Patricia Kitcher - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):63-64.details
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Parallelism and patterns of thought.R. W. Kentridge - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):670-671.details
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The Multiply Qualitative.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):239-262.details
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A long time ago in a computing lab far, far away….Jeffery L. Johnson, R. H. Ettinger & Timothy L. Hubbard - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):670-670.details
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Sensory pain and conscious pain.Julian Jaynes - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):61-63.details
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Self-consciousness and phenomenal character.Greg Janzen - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):707-733.details
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Consciousness as Existence, and the End of Intentionality.Ted Honderich - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:1-26.details
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Selecting for the con in consciousness.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):668-669.details
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Mind and Brain: The Identity Hypothesis.R. J. Hirst - 1968 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 1:160-180.details
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How do things look to the color-blind?David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 259.details
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Penrose's Platonism.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):667-668.details
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Radical Empiricism, Critical Realism, and American Functionalism: James and Sellars.Gary Hatfield - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):129-53.details
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Is pain overt behavior?Gilbert Harman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):61-61.details
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Perception and Evaluation: Aristotle on the Moral Imagination.R. J. Hankinson - 1990 - Dialogue 29 (1):41-.details
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Defining knowledge in terms of belief: The modal logic perspective.Joseph Y. Halpern, Dov Samet & Ella Segev - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):469-487.details
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