The idea that conventionalized general knowledge – sometimes referred to as a frame – guides the perception and interpretation of the world around us has long permeated various branches of cognitive science, including psychology, linguistics, and artificial intelligence. In this paper we provide experimental evidence suggesting that frames also play a role in explaining certain long-distance dependency phenomena, as originally proposed by Deane. We focus on a constraint that restricts the extraction of an NP from another NP, called subextraction, which (...) Deane claims is ultimately a framing effect. In Experiment 1 we provide evidence showing that referents are extractable to the degree that they are deemed important for the proposition expressed by the utterance. This suggests that the world knowledge that the main verb evokes plays a key role in establishing which referents are extractable. In Experiment 2 we offer evidence suggesting that the acceptability of deep subextractions is correlated with the overall plausibility of the proposition, suggesting that complex structures can evoke complex frames as well, if sufficiently frequent and semantically coherent, and therefore more easily license deeper subextractions. (shrink)

This volume, and in general this moment in the history of science, is calling for us linguists, and especially those of us who have worked in Minimalism, to characterize what it is that our approach has discovered, that we want to embrace and move forward with, and what it is that we need to discard. There is plenty in both categories, and it is precisely the considerations of biology (e.g. language evolution) that can help us weed out the burdensome, damaging (...) aspects of this approach. Too often we linguists look down upon the study of language evolution as some kind of marginal topic that need not concern “true” linguists, and we prefer to just wait until geneticists, biologists, and neuroscientists figure it all out. And yet, it is only linguists who can put forward specific, linguistically informed hypotheses that can be subjected to interdisciplinary testing. The emphasis here is on specific, falsifiable hypotheses, rather than some vague assertions that cannot be subjected to falsification. It is true that many such specific hypotheses will be proven wrong, but after all, the nature of the scientific process is simply to narrow down the range of possibilities. My focus here is on a few influential assumptions/postulates in Minimalism that are particularly harmful in establishing meaningful links between language and biology, and which, both on this ground, and based on more careful linguistic considerations, should be abandoned. I will also point to certain postulates... (shrink)

The possibility of extraction across awh-island is usually assumed to be dependent on whether or not the constituent in question can undergo “long” (i.e., nonlocal) Ā-movement across the island. However, the question of how to make a principled distinction between those elements which can violate locality and those which cannot is still rather controversial. I will propose that there are no well-formed locality violations in these cases, and that the grammaticality patterns observed derive from a semantic filter on the escape (...) hatch used to bypass the island. In other words, if a phrase is extracted across awh-island, it must adjoin to the island in order to get by. This adjunction site is restricted by the interpretive component: only traces which are interpreted as variables of typee can occur in this position, while higher-order variables are not allowed. This restriction is shown to capture the known facts aboutwh-island violations, as well as some less known phenomena, such as the absence of functional (and pair-list) readings acrosswh-islands. (shrink)