A common idea about assessing meaning in life is that one draws up a list of those various positive values that one has achieved and subtracts from it one's negative deeds in life. The resulting balance is the meaningfulness of one's existence. I call this the ledger theory. Drawing on the work of Raimond Gaita and Julian Barnes's novel The Sense of an Ending, I argue for a phenomenology of remorse that gives us reason to reject the ledger theory. Even (...) those agents whose lives have been exceptionally meaningful in some respects may remain haunted by their past. Certain sorts of misdeeds – those that involve significant, irreparable damage – leave life marred in such a way that the negative remains, even in the face of all the meaningful deeds of life. (shrink)

Definition of the problem The eleventh version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11), which became effective in 2022, has raised a number of issues associated with medical ethics. Arguments In this context the paper explores the normative view of grief as a disease. ICD-11 contains the new diagnosis of “prolonged grief disorder” with a definition that fails to aid its clear distinction from the normal course of grief. The article discusses the philosophical and ethical implications of this diagnosis and (...) explores the risks of medicalizing and pathologizing grief which may lead to an undermining of its value. Conclusions and further perspectives The paper’s specific focus is the particular case of parental grief. We show that pediatric palliative care counteracts many risk factors for difficult grief reactions and may therefore serve as a valuable instrument for their prevention. We propose in this context the concept of “advance bereavement planning” as a potentially beneficial extension of advance care planning and palliative care in general. (shrink)

I respond here to commentators’ concerns about the scope of grief, further clarifying the role of practical identity in those whose deaths we grieve; elaborating my understanding of grief as egocentric; defending my own resolution of the paradox of grief against alternative resolutions proposed by my commentators; and substantiating the role of self-knowledge in the self-regarding duty to grieve.

Psychopaths exhibit diminished ability to grieve. Here I address whether this inability can be explained by the trademark feature of psychopaths, namely, their diminished capacity for interpersonal empathy. I argue that this hypothesis turns out to be correct, but requires that we conceptualize empathy not merely as an ability to relate (emotionally and ethically) to other individuals but also as an ability to relate to past and present iterations of ourselves. This reconceptualization accords well with evidence regarding psychopaths’ intense focus (...) on the temporal present and difficulties in engaging in mental time travel, as well as with the essentially egocentric and identity-based nature of grief. -/- . (shrink)