ABSTRACTA fundamental principle of all truth-conditional approaches to semantics is that the meanings of sentences of natural language can be compositionally specified in terms of truth conditions, where the meanings of the sentences’ parts are specified in terms of the contribution they make to such conditions their host sentences possess. Thus, meanings of words fit the meanings of sentences at least to the extent that the stability of what a sentence might mean as specified in a theory is in accord (...) with the stability of what a word might mean as similarly specified. In this paper, I shall be concerned with Ludlow’s idea that, in fact, there need be no such sympathy between words and sentences. He proposes that we can square what he calls a dynamic lexicon, where word meaning is not stable at all, with a traditional truth-conditional approach of the kind indicated, where sentence meaning is delivered via ‘absolute truth conditions’. I share Ludlow’s aspiration to accommodate dynamic features of word meaning with a truth conditional approach, but not his belief that the marriage is an easy deal. Thus, I shall present a problem for Ludlow’s position and show how resolving this problem leads to an alternative picture of how the meaning of a sentence may be truth-conditionally specified with all relevant dynamic features of the lexicon retained. (shrink)

The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an (...) eschewal of folk understanding. The latter half of the paper argues that, contrary to the received view, Chomsky's review of Skinner offers not just an argument against Skinner's eliminativism, but, more centrally, one in favour of the second eliminativism. (shrink)

Griffiths and Machery (2008) argue that innateness is a ?folk biological? notion, which, as such, has no useful reconstruction in contemporary biology. If this is so, not only is it wrong to identify the vernacular notion with the precise theoretical concept of canalization, but worse, it would appear that many of the putative scientific claims for particular competences and capacities being innate are simply misplaced. The present paper challenges the core substantive claim of Griffiths and Machery's position, namely, that innateness (...) understood on canalization lines as environment-independent development (somehow and to some degree) is a confused, outmoded notion. It will be contended that the modality-independence of language offers a prima facie case against Griffiths and Machery's general position. (shrink)

This paper proposes a concept of creativity that stems from a semiotic and linguistic theoretical perspective, in which the formal frame of reference for variation and linguistic change considers and evaluates both the process of general interaction and the contact of languages as a global phenomenon. This method proposes an analysis of creativity that ranges from reflections of ancient philosophy to a contemporary linguistic perspective, incorporates international ideologies, and identifies, within the dimensions of use and social sharing, the principle capable (...) of guiding potentially unlimited forms of linguistic creativity that are self-expressive and communicative, far beyond the grammatical patterns of regularity and norm. Interpreting the paradigm of creativity according to this model means placing the semiotic property in a position of prima inter pares, entrusted not only with the “role” of forming signs (words, sentences, texts), but the function of arbitraire, as a phenomenon of language creation. The following reading references the semiotic contribution of Tullio De Mauro, an Italian linguist who has contributed to the systematization of creativity, overcoming and synthesizing both Saussurian structuralism and Chomskyan generativism. (shrink)

We recorded Event-Related Potentials to investigate differences in the use of gender information during the processing of reflexive pronouns. Pronouns either matched the gender provided by role nouns (such as “king” or “engineer”) or did not. We compared two types of gender information, definitional information, which is semantic in nature (a mother is female), or stereotypical (a nurse is likely to be female). When they followed definitional role-nouns, gender-mismatching pronouns elicited a P600 effect reflecting a failure in the agreement process. (...) When instead the gender violation occurred after stereotypical role-nouns the Event Related Potential response was biphasic, being positive in parietal electrodes and negative in anterior left electrodes. The use of a correlational approach showed that those participants with more “feminine” or “expressive” self sex-role descriptions showed a P600 response for stereotype violations, suggesting that they experienced the mismatch as an agreement violation; whereas less “expressive” participants showed an Nref effect, indicating more effort spent in linking the pronouns with the possible, although less likely, counter-stereotypical referent. (shrink)

Structural priming offers a powerful method for experimentally investigating the mental representation of linguistic structure. We clarify the nature of our proposal, justify the versatility of priming, consider alternative approaches, and discuss how our specific account can be extended to new questions as part of an interdisciplinary programme integrating linguistics and psychology as part of the cognitive sciences of language.

This paper focuses on the linguistic evidence base provided by proponents of conceptualism (e.g., Chomsky) and rational realism (e.g., Katz) and challenges some of the arguments alleging that the evidence allowed by conceptualists is superior to that of rational realists. Three points support this challenge. First, neither conceptualists nor realists are in a position to offer direct evidence. This challenges the conceptualists’ claim that their evidence is inherently superior. Differences between the kinds of available indirect evidence will be discussed. Second, (...) at least some of the empirical evidence provided by the conceptualist is flawed. It is not obtained independently of theoretical commitments, alternative interpretations have not been ruled out, and some of the thought experiments intended to extend the evidence base are conceptually flawed. Third, the widely held assumption that rational realism disallows empirical evidence relevant to linguistics is dubious. It will be shown that the limitation imposed by rational realism concerns strictly formal linguistics. The rationalist realist has no reason to impose any restriction on the evidence relevant to psycholinguistics. I conclude that it is a mistake to dismiss realism based on the assumption that it imposes undue restrictions on evidence that is relevant to linguistics. (shrink)

Branigan & Pickering (B&P) present a case that linguistic theory should pay heed to the results of structural priming studies. I can agree with this wholeheartedly. Since the pioneering work of Bock (Reference Bock1986), structural priming has provided interesting evidence for the construction of linguistic representations as part of the process of sentence generation and understanding. B&P are somewhat ambivalent on the question of whether linguistic theory should pay heed only to structural priming (as seems implied in the abstract) or (...) simply add it to the repertoire of methodologies for testing the predictions of theories. If simply an addition to the repertoire, again, I am in thorough agreement. (shrink)