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Reply to Egan

In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 268--274 (2003)

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  1. Language and scientific explanation: Where does semantics fit in?Eran Asoulin - 2020 - Berlin, Germany: Language Science Press.
    This book discusses the two main construals of the explanatory goals of semantic theories. The first, externalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of a hermeneutic and interpretive explanatory project. The second, internalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which meanings are generated. It is argued that a fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to uncover the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible, and that a scientific (...)
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  • How to think about mental content.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.
    Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...)
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  • The Nature and Function of Content in Computational Models.Frances Egan - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge.
    Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational capacities, or as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the distal scene. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the ubiquity of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. The point of this chapter is to sketch an account of the nature (...)
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  • What refers? How?Alexander Barber - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Emerald Group Publishing. pp. 49–80.
    “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” This National Rifle Association slogan has a popular analogue in the philosophy of language: words don’t refer to things, people refer to things. This paper looks at how the question of what refers intersects with the phenomenon of opacity. The discussion is used to motivate an important revision to standard intention-based accounts of speaker reference, one that takes due account of the fact that distinct words can have the same referent.
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  • Enacting anti-representationalism. The scope and the limits of enactive critiques of representationalism.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):43-86.
    I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are (...)
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  • Meta-scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior.John Collins - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625-658.
    The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an (...)
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  • Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision.Arnold Silverberg - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.
    Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr.
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  • O “sujeito científico” no sistema filosófico de A. Badiou: o caso da biolinguística chomskyana.Norman R. Madarasz - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (3):466-491.
    Neste artigo argumenta-se que o programa biolinguístico de Noam Chomsky contém uma ontologia subjacente cuja implicação diz respeito a uma transformação radical da noção de sujeito e da categoria de identidade que lhe sustenta, assim como da noção kuhniana de ciência normal. De fato, um dos desafios de uma ontologia estruturalista da qual Chomsky é pessoalmente distante, mas formalmente próximo, é de transpor as teses sobre o real da questão do ser e do acontecimento para um realismo, campo que proporciona (...)
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