In his evaluation of the mad despot Cambyses, Herodotus proclaims that preference for one’s own culture persists after examination. This paper examines how Herodotus’ treatment of Cambyses reveals the insidious ways that thought is bounded by cultural attachments. Blindness to one’s attachments spurs the drive to empire by covering and justifying expansionist appetites. Herodotus’ treatment of Cambyses’ imperialist inquiries will thus not only implicate the Persians, but raise unsettling questions about the Hellenes’ own appetites. Herodotus offers his own methods of (...) inquiry as an alternative. Rather than denying appetite and rendering it subterranean, Herodotus suggests that inquiry must be motivated by the quest for self-knowledge – understanding the diversity of the world helps reveal the fuller contours of human nature. Herodotus’ storytelling engages affect by provoking the intellectual curiosity of his audience. It promises that expansionist appetites can be rehabilitated into genuine curiosity and openness to difference. (shrink)

Two themes, the elusiveness of wisdom and the distortion of speech, are traced through three important scenes of Herodotus' Lydian logos, the meeting of Solon and Croesus , the scene where Cyrus places Croesus on the pyre , and the advice of Croesus to Cyrus to cross the river and fight the Massagetae in their own territory . The paper discusses whether Solon is speaking indirectly at 1.29–33, unable to talk straight to Croesus about his transgressive behavior: if so, that (...) illuminates the dynamics of speech at a court. At 1.86–90 Croesus may not have fully understood what Solon earlier said to him. Cyrus may understand Croesus' report of Solon's words better than Croesus does himself. Herodotus' readers will also be uncertain what the response of Delphi will be to Croesus' indignant questioning: if a reader has failed to grasp the significance of Gyges' transgression five generations earlier, that reenacts the forgetfulness of figures in the text. At 1.207 Croesus' advice to Cyrus is of questionable wisdom: Croesus too cannot speak directly, and he has anyway learned the wrong lesson from his catastrophe, extrapolating too directly from his own experience. The conclusion suggests some reasons why Herodotus should have chosen to begin his History with Lydia, the kingdom that is on the cusp between East and West, and with Croesus, a figure that resists description in the easy formulations of Greek/barbarian discourse. (shrink)

When Herodotus uses the first person plural in phrases like "We know," "We say," and so on, the modern reader naturally takes this either to refer to his ethnic group or to be something like the scholarly first person plural: an appeal to consensus among a group of qualied experts. Neither is the case. Only once does Herodotus' "we" refer to the Greeks as a group; in virtually every other instance it must be interpreted as plural for singular. It refers, (...) that is, to Herodotus himself, and himself alone. Most importantly, it refers to him in his activity as inquirer, arbiter and composer of stories. History, as Herodotus presents it, has a plural voice. We can understand this, first, in relation to the poetic plural in lyric and epic. In epic, the plural voice is that of the audience, spectator and arbiter to a contest of powerful individuals. In lyric, a poet uses the plural in order to speak with the authority of the whole chorus, which is itself a kind of involved audience to the events it represents. A second way to understand the historian’s plural voice to is see how characters within Herodotus’ text use, or attempt to use, the same pluralising rhetoric. In one instance, a competitive individual tries and fails to assume the plural voice; in another, the voice belongs to a genuinely plural — and strangely anonymous — group of bystanders. Again, the plural voice is that of the interpreting, assessing audience, rather than that of the competing individual. (shrink)

Early in Book 1 of Herodotus' Histories, Solon speaks to Croesus about the jealousy of the gods and the ephemeral nature of human happiness. Since Solon's speech is so prominently placed, and since it introduces themes that recur throughout the Histories, it has traditionally been seen as programmatic, i.e., as expressing Herodotus' own views about the gods and human happiness. Although the assumption that Solon speaks for Herodotus has long been the standard view, it has recently been challenged on the (...) grounds that Herodotus himself never directly affirms his agreement with what Solon says. On the other hand, many scholars have noted that Herodotus does not always state his views directly: he often uses literary devices such as analogy, juxtaposition, and the repetition of narrative patterns to indicate his views. After isolating the three main principles of Solon's speech, this paper examines the direct and indirect evidence for Herodotus' acceptance of these principles. After examining the evidence in Books 1-9 of the Histories, the paper concludes that Herodotus does indeed agree with the views of his character Solon, and that he makes his agreement clear both explicitly and implicitly, through analogy, repetition, and juxtaposition. Moreover, the position of Solon's speech indicates that Herodotus meant it to be programmatic, setting forth basic assumptions about the nature of human life and its relation to the gods which could then provide a philosophical framework for the Histories as a whole. (shrink)

Herodotos and Thoukydides report on many occasions that kings, polis leaders, and other politicians speak and behave in ways that unintentionally announce or analyze situations incorrectly (misinformation). Elsewhere, they represent as facts knowingly false constructs or “fake news” (disinformation), or they slant data in ways that advance a cause personal or public (propaganda, true or false). Historians attempt to or claim to acquaint audiences with a truer fact situation and to identify subjects’ motives for distortion such as immediate personal advantage, (...) community advantage, or to encourage posterity’s better (if mistaken) opinion. Such historiographical bifocalism enhances the historian’s authority with readers (as he sees through intentional or unintentional misrepresentations) as well as sets straight distorted historical records. This paper surveys two paradigmatic Hellenic historians’ texts, how they build their investigative and analytic authority, and how they encourage confidence in their truth-determining skills. The material collected confirms and assesses the frequency of persons and governments misleading their own citizens and subjects as well as rival persons and powers. Finally, it demonstrates that these two historians were aware of information loss, information control (dissemination and suppression), and information chaos. (shrink)