Advocates of moral enhancement through pharmacological, genetic, or other direct interventions sometimes explicitly argue, or assume without argument, that traditional moral education and development is insufficient to bring about moral enhancement. Traditional moral education grounded in a Kohlbergian theory of moral development is indeed unsuitable for that task; however, the psychology of moral development and education has come a long way since then. Recent studies support the view that moral cognition is a higher-order process, unified at a functional level, and (...) that a specific moral faculty does not exist. It is more likely that moral cognition involves a number of different mechanisms, each connected to other cognitive and affective processes. Taking this evidence into account, we propose a novel, empirically informed approach to moral development and education, in children and adults, which is based on a cognitive-affective approach to moral dispositions. This is an interpretative approach that derives from the cognitive-affective personality system (Mischel and Shoda, 1995). This conception individuates moral dispositions by reference to the cognitive and affective processes that realise them. Conceived of in this way, moral dispositions influence an agent's behaviour when they interact with situational factors, such as mood or social context. Understanding moral dispositions in this way lays the groundwork for proposing a range of indirect methods of moral enhancement, techniques that promise similar results as direct interventions whilst posing fewer risks. (shrink)

Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, (...) I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate that, by virtue of its traditional or conservative features, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be incorporated into the traditional moral education network. Finally, I conclude that, being a part of the traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be a unique and ethically acceptable option of moral neuroenhancement. (shrink)

To gain insight into the reasons that the public may have for endorsing or eschewing pharmacological moral enhancement for themselves or for others, we used empirical tools to explore public attitudes towards these issues. Participants from the United States were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were randomly assigned to read one of several contrastive vignettes in which a 13-year-old child is described as bullying another student in school and then is offered an empathy-enhancing program. The empathy-enhancing program is described (...) as either involving taking a pill or playing a video game on a daily basis for four weeks. In addition, participants were asked to imagine either their own child bullying another student at school, or their own child being bullied by another student. This resulted in a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. In an escalating series of morally challenging questions, we asked participants to rate their overall support for the program; whether they would support requiring participation; whether they would support requiring participation of children who are at higher risk to become bullies in the future; whether they would support requiring participation of all children or even the entire population; and whether they would be willing to participate in the program themselves. We found that people were significantly more troubled by pharmacological as opposed to non-pharmacological moral enhancement interventions. The results indicate that members of the public for the greater part oppose pharmacological moral bioenhancement, yet are open to non-biomedical means to attain moral enhancement. [248 words]. (shrink)

Biomedical moral enhancement, or BME for short, aims to improve people’s moral behaviors through augmenting, via biomedical means, their virtuous dispositions such as sympathy, honesty, courage, or generosity. Recently, it has been challenged, on particularist grounds, however, that the manifestations of the virtuous dispositions can be morally wrong. For instance, being generous in terrorist financing is one such case. If so, biomedical moral enhancement, by enhancing people’s virtues, might turn out to be counterproductive in terms of people’s moral behaviors. In (...) this paper, we argue, via a comparison with moral education, that the case for the practice of biomedical moral enhancement is not weakened by the particularists’ stress on the variable moral statuses of the manifestations of our virtues. The real challenge from the particularists, we argue, lies elsewhere. It is that practical wisdom, being essentially context-sensitive, cannot be enhanced via biomedical means. On the basis of this, we further argue that BME ought to be used with great caution, for it may wrongly enhance, for instance, a terrorist financier’s generosity, a robber’s courage, or an undercover detective’s honesty. Finally, we sketch how boundaries can be set on the use of BME, and address some potential objections to our position. (shrink)

The debate on the ethical aspects of moral bioenhancement focuses on the desirability of using biomedical as opposed to traditional means to achieve moral betterment. The aim of this paper is to systematically review the ethical reasons presented in the literature for and against moral bioenhancement.

인간의 도덕적 향상을 허용해야 하는지의 문제는 신경과학 시대에서 우리가 직면한 대표적인 윤리적 쟁점 가운데 하나이다. 도덕적 향상에 관한 대립적 입장은 생명보수주의와 초인본주의의 양 극단으로 분류된다. 생명보수주의는 인간의 도덕적 향상이 결국엔 인간다음과 인간 본성을 파괴할 위험성이 크다고 경고한다. 이와는 달리 초인본주의는 인류의 도덕적 향상은 더 나은 삶의 영위를 위해 필수불가결한 것이라고 주장한다. 생명보수주의는 인간 본성의 내재적 가치를 주장하지만, 초인본주의는 인간 본성은 문제가 많으므로 개선을 필요로 한다고 본다. 이에 이 논문에서는 초인본주의의 기본 개념과 철학, 초인본주의에서의 도덕적 향상 논리 및 생명정치학적 입장에 대하여 (...) 살펴본 후에, 초인본주의의 도전에 대응하기 위한 방안을 제안하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 이 논문에서는 초인본주의에서의 도덕적 향상 논리가 지닌 문제점을 지적함과 동시에 인간의 도덕성은 기술적 개입이 아닌 도덕교육을 통해 함양될 필요가 있음을 역설하였다. (shrink)

도덕적 신경과학의 목적은 인간 도덕성의 원인과 기제에 대한 심층적이고 포괄적인 이해를 제공하는 것이다. 도덕성에 대한 신경과학 접근의 주된 강점은 인간 정신의 숨은 과정(hidden process)을 밝혀낼 수 있다는 것이다. 도덕교육 연구자들은 신경과학의 연구 및 실천이 제기하는 윤리적 문제가 무엇인지를 밝혀냄과 동시에 신경과학의 연구 성과들이 기존의 도덕성 및 도덕교육 이론에 함의하는 바가 무엇인지를 밝혀내야 하는 이중적인 학문적 도전에 직면해 있다. 이에 이 글에서는 신경윤리학과 도덕적 신경과학에 관한 문헌 분석에 근거하여 신경윤리학의 개념과 연구 주제에 대해 살펴보고, 최근의 신경과학 연구 결과 및 실천이 제기하는 (...) 윤리적 문제와 신경과학의 연구 결과들이 우리의 도덕교육에 시사해 주는 바가 무엇인지를 탐색해 봄으로써 신경과학 시대에서 우리가 지향해야 할 도덕교육의 새로운 패러다임을 제안하고자 한다. 신경과학 시대에서 도덕교육은 이성과 감정, 추론과 직관, 명시적 지식과 암묵적 지식, 숙고적 정신과 직관적 정신의 균형을 추구하는 가운데, 신경윤리학을 도덕교육의 내용으로 도입해야 한다. 그리고 도덕 교사는 학생들의 추론과 숙고를 촉진시키는 환경을 조성하고, 그들의 직관 발달에 도움이 되는 환경을 선택하도록 도울 수 있는 멘토로서의 역할을 충실하게 수행해야 할 것이다. (shrink)

Advocates of moral enhancement through pharmacological, genetic, or other direct interventions sometimes explicitly argue, or assume without argument, that traditional moral education and development is insufficient to bring about moral enhancement. Traditional moral education grounded in a Kohlbergian theory of moral development is indeed unsuitable for that task; however, the psychology of moral development and education has come a long way since then. Recent studies support the view that moral cognition is a higher-order process, unified at a functional level, and (...) that a specific moral faculty does not exist. It is more likely that moral cognition involves a number of different mechanisms, each connected to other cognitive and affective processes. Taking this evidence into account, we propose a novel, empirically informed approach to moral development and education, in children and adults, which is based on a cognitive-affective approach to moral dispositions. This is an interpretative approach that derives from the cognitive-affective personality system (Mischel and Shoda, 1995). This conception individuates moral dispositions by reference to the cognitive and affective processes that realise them. Conceived of in this way, moral dispositions influence an agent's behaviour when they interact with situational factors, such as mood or social context. Understanding moral dispositions in this way lays the groundwork for proposing a range of indirect methods of moral enhancement, techniques that promise similar results as direct interventions whilst posing fewer risks. (shrink)