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  1. Simplicity, one-shot hypotheses and paleobiological explanation.Adrian Currie - 2019 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41 (1):10.
    Paleobiologists often provide simple narratives to explain complex, contingent episodes. These narratives are sometimes ‘one-shot hypotheses’ which are treated as being mutually exclusive with other possible explanations of the target episode, and are thus extended to accommodate as much about the episode as possible. I argue that a provisional preference for such hypotheses provides two kinds of productive scaffolding. First, they generate ‘hypothetical difference-makers’: one-shot hypotheses highlight and isolate empirically tractable dependencies between variables. Second, investigations of hypothetical difference-makers provision explanatory (...)
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  • On the Speculative Nature of Our Self Conception: A Reply to Some Criticisms.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11:157-173.
    I must begin by thanking the editors for offering me the opportunity to respond to two of the other papers in this collection: ‘A Materialist's Misgivings about Eliminative Materialism,’ by Jeff Foss; and ‘Sensation, Theory, and Meaning,’ by Bonnie Thurston and Sam Coval. In some earlier publications I have defended eliminative materialism at some length, and in others I have argued that the semantics of common observation terms is exhausted by their inferential or conceptual role, to the exclusion of any (...)
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  • On the Speculative Nature of Our Self Conception: A Reply to Some Criticisms.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11:157-173.
    I must begin by thanking the editors for offering me the opportunity to respond to two of the other papers in this collection: ‘A Materialist's Misgivings about Eliminative Materialism,’ by Jeff Foss; and ‘Sensation, Theory, and Meaning,’ by Bonnie Thurston and Sam Coval. In some earlier publications I have defended eliminative materialism at some length, and in others I have argued that the semantics of common observation terms is exhausted by their inferential or conceptual role, to the exclusion of any (...)
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  • Van Fraassen's instrumentalism.Alan Mcmichael - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):257-272.
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  • The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology.Kenneth R. Livingston - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59.
    The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our (...)
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  • A Modest Refutation of Manifestationalism.Alessio Gava - 2019 - Universitas Philosophica 36 (73):259-287.
    In their recent “A modest defense of manifestationalism” (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen’s argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature (...)
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  • On accepting Van Fraassen's image of science.Jeff Foss - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):79-92.
    In his book, The Scientific Image, van Fraassen lucidly draws an alternative to scientific realism, which he calls "Constructive Empiricism". In this epistemological theory, the concept of observability plays the pivotal role: acceptable theories may be believed only where what they say solely concerns observables. Van Fraassen develops a concept of observability which is, as he admits, vague, relative, science-dependent, and anthropocentric. I draw out unacceptable consequences of each of these aspects of his concept. Also, I argue against his assumption (...)
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  • How to save van Fraassen’s own antirealism: a modest proposal.Alessio Gava - 2020 - Perspectiva Filosófica 45 (1):1-21.
    Bas van Fraassen’s antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow (...)
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