Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Remarks on the “thickness” of action description: with Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Anscombe.Julia Tanney - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):170-177.
    This paper considers insoluble difficulties for the supposition that intentions, “acts of will”, and reasons for acting, construed as mental events, could be the special ingredient that would render bodily movements into voluntary or intentional actions. Yet, the distinction between mere bodily movements and actions is often made by introducing intentions, acts of will, and reasons for acting. How is this to be reconciled? Criticising the tendency to view the “thick descriptions” of everyday discourse through a metaphysical scheme that relies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Der ‚intentionale Fehlschluß‘ — ein Dogma?Lutz Danneberg & Hans-Harald Müller - 1983 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (2):376-411.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Art, Expression, Perception and Intentionality.Dale Jacquette - 2014 - Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology 1 (1):63-90.
    ABSTRACTThe ideological and methodological oppositions that divide philosophy generally into realisms and idealisms, objectivisms and subjectivisms, also pervade aesthetic theory. The question arises whether there was beauty in the world prior to the emergence of intelligent perceivers like ourselves, or whether beauty itself comes into existence only through the perceptual idiosyncrasies with which we happen to encounter the objects we happen to consider beautiful. The experience of beauty and its opposites under this description can easily seem to be an altogether (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Artist's Privileged Status.Mark Roskill - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (208):187 - 198.
    The topic of this paper is one more alluded to than actually studied, both in current philosophy of art and in the theory of criticism. There is a reason for this, which both clarifies the issue and suggests how it is to be approached. To suppose that the person responsible for a work of art has at least something interesting to say about it is only natural, and even commonplace. But granted this, the qualifications to be put on that assumption (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations