In this issue of Clinical Ethics, Jonathan Pugh rejects hypothetical consent-based conceptions of the child’s right to bodily integrity (RBI). Pugh also questions the relevance of adults’ regret of past bodily infringements in evaluating potential violations of children’s RBI. Pugh then argues that autonomy serves as the justification for our power to waive our bodily rights. Finally, Pugh claims that the child’s interest in developing the capacity for autonomy is key to evaluating potential RBI violations. In this article, I challenge (...) each of these arguments. First, I argue that it is the circumstances of parents vis-a-vis their children (rather than the difficulties in determining hypothetical agents' values) that should lead us to reject hypothetical-consent-based conceptions of the child’s RBI in favor of best-interests conceptions. Second, I argue that adults’ regret of childhood bodily interventions is highly relevant for evaluating these interventions’ permissibility. Third, I reject the claim that autonomy is the primary justification for our power to waive our bodily rights. Finally, I argue that Pugh overstates the importance of the child’s interest in developing the capacity for autonomy, at least when it comes to debates in contemporary liberal democracies over interventions in children’s bodies. (shrink)

In Beyond Neutrality, George Sher criticises the idea that state neutrality between competing conceptions of the good helps protect society from oppression. While he is correct that some governments are non-neutral without being oppressive, I argue that those governments may be neutral at the core of their foundations. The possibility of non-neutrality leading to oppression is further explored; some conceptions of the good would favour oppression while others would not. While it is possible that a non-neutral state may avoid oppression, (...) it is argued that the risks are so great that it is better to bet on government being neutral, thereby minimizing the possibility of oppression. (shrink)

BackgroundIn many countries health insurers, employers and especially governments are increasingly using pressure and coercion to enhance healthier lifestyles. For example by ever higher taxes on cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, and ever stricter smoke-free policies. Such interventions can enhance healthier behaviour, but when they become too intrusive, an unfree society can emerge. Which lifestyle interventions that use pressure or coercion are justifiable and which are not? We tried to develop an assessment model that can be used for answering this question, (...) on a generally acceptable way, for all sorts of lifestyle interventions.MethodsThe intended assessment model was developed in three phases. In the first phase the model was theoretically developed on the basis of literature study and reasoning. In the second phase the model was empirically tested by assessing two detailed cases from everyday practice using the model. The model was improved again and again. In the third phase the 10th version of the model was developed while writing this article.ResultsAn assessment model for the justification of intrusive lifestyle interventions. It comprises three components: 12 assessment criteria ; an assessment structure with three filters ; a way of assessing.ConclusionsWe have developed an assessment model for the justification of lifestyle interventions that use pressure or coercion to promote health. The correctness, completeness and practicality of the model are likely. Important principles for the justification are the logic and completeness of the underlying argumentation and the proper use of the available scientific information. Parties for and against a particular intervention could use the model to test and strengthen their argumentation and to improve the quality of the intervention. (shrink)

In his article, Ismaili M’hamdi argues that a neutralist approach in public health policy might turn into a gap that separates citizens who endure preventable poor conditions from the state...

This paper scrutinizes the tension between individuals’ rights and paternalism. I will argue that no normative account that includes rights of individuals can justify hard paternalism since the infringement of a right can only be justified with the right or interest of another person, which is never the case in hard paternalism. Justifications of hard paternalistic actions generally include a deviation from the very idea of having rights. The paper first introduces Tom Beauchamp as the most famous contemporary hard paternalist (...) by outlining his moral theory (principlism) and showing why it, as it stands, has to allow for hard paternalism. Secondly, the paper focuses on the notion of rights within principlism. I will employ traditional theories of rights to make sense of rights in principlism. Unfortunately, this attempt fails. In the third part, then, I claim that rights can only be limited with reference to the rights or interests of others. This structure is the very point of rights, it is their bite. I will argue for this claim and show its implications. The most important implication is that not only principlism, but every normative theory that includes rights of individuals, has to abolish hard paternalism. (shrink)