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Decomposing the Will

, US: Oxford University Press USA (2013)

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  1. Critique and cognitive capacities: Towards an action-oriented model.Magnus Hörnqvist - 2021 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 48 (1):62-85.
    In response to an impasse, articulated in the late 1980s, the cognitive capacities of ordinary people assumed central place in contemporary critical social theory. The participants’ perspective gained precedence over scientific standards branded as external. The notion of cognition, however, went unchallenged. This article continues the move away from external standards, and discusses two models of critique, which differ based on their underlying notions of cognition. The representational model builds on cognitive content, misrecognition and normativity; three features which are illustrated (...)
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  • Unconscious Motives and Actions – Agency, Freedom and Responsibility.Christoph Lumer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:428144.
    According to many criteria, agency, intentionality, responsibility and freedom of decision, require conscious decisions. Freud already assumed that many of our decisions are influenced by dynamically unconscious motives or that we even perform unconscious actions based on completely unconscious considerations. Such actions might not be intentional, and perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, we would not be responsible for them and freedom of decision would be missing. Recent psychological and neurophysiological research has added to this a number of (...)
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  • How do you know that you settled a question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
    It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the challenge (...)
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  • The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not (...)
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  • Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It.Andrea Lavazza - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10.
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  • Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility for Self-Deluding Beings.David J. Franz - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1791-1807.
    In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of moral responsibility. Second, this viewpoint leads to a reasons-focused account of human behavior. Examples of human action discussed in debates about moral responsibility suggest that typical human actions are driven primarily by the agent’s subjective reasons and are sufficiently transparent for the agent. Third, this conception of self-transparent action is a questionable idealization. (...)
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  • Self knowledge and knowing other minds: The implicit / explicit distinction as a tool in understanding theory of mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2012 - British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155.
    Holding content explicitly requires a form of self knowledge. But what does the relevant self knowledge look like? Using theory of mind as an example, this paper argues that the correct answer to this question will have to take into account the crucial role of language based deliberation, but warns against the standard assumption that explicitness is necessary for ascribing awareness. It argues in line with Bayne that intentional action is at least an equally valid criterion for awareness. This leads (...)
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