In the opening sections of his Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte argues that mutual recognition is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. However, the argument turns on the apparently unconvincing claim that, in the context of transcendental philosophy, conceptions of the subject as an isolated individual give rise to a vicious circle the resolution of which requires the introduction of a second rational being to ‘summon’ the first. In this essay, my aim is to present a revised account of (...) the opening arguments on which they are more convincing. In particular, I argue that the problem of a circle is genuine and may be seen to result from a relation of mutual dependence between agency and cognition which ensures that for an exercise of either capacity to take place, an exercise of the other would have already had to have taken place with the result that neither can occur. Moreover, the solution is successful. The summons prevents us from being driven around the circle once more because it is a ‘synthesis’ that reconciles the constraint to which I am subject as a cognizer of independently given objects and my freedom as a self-determining subject. (shrink)

Volume 31, Issue 1, January 2023, Page 103-126.

The conventional wisdom regarding the aims and shortcomings of Kantian constructivism is mistaken. The aim of metaethical constructivism is not to provide a naturalistic account of the objectivity of normative facts by deriving substantive morality from a conception of agency so thin as to be uncontroversial (a task at which it is generally regarded to have failed). Its aim is to explain the “grip” that normative facts have on us—to avoid what I call the problem of normative alienation. So understood, (...) Kantian constructivism faces two problems: that determinate normative facts cannot be derived from agency and that its individualistic conception of agency cannot account for the sociality of morality. I propose and elaborate a social conception of agency that is better able to address the latter problem while still avoiding normative alienation, and evaluate two different strategies for responding to the former problem. (shrink)

Metaethical constructivism aims to explain morality’s authority and relevance by basing it in agency, in a capacity of the creatures who are in fact morally bound. But constructivists have struggled to wring anything recognizably moral from an appropriately minimal conception of agency. Even if they could, basing our reasons in our individual agency seems to make other people reason-giving for us only indirectly. This paper argues for a constructivism based on a social conception of agency, on which our capacity to (...) recognize ourselves as having reasons ties us inescapably to others. It argues that mutual recognition is a pervasive feature of linguistic concepts, and builds this into a view called transformative expressivism. (shrink)

This chapter is an attempt to resolve two sets of disagreements on Fichte’s theory of right. One disagreement concerns the content of Fichtean property rights, and the other is about the role of coercion in the formation of the Fichtean social order. With respect to the first disagreement I argue that it stems from the mistaken assumption that Fichte is committed to a particular universally applicable right to property. Once this assumption is dropped, it is possible to appreciate the variety (...) of such rights that his theory can support. With respect to the second disagreement I argue that Fichte does not see a necessary conflict between coercion and freedom; in fact, he believes coercion is conducive to the formation of rightful relations among free persons. (shrink)

J. G. Fichte held that a form of intersubjectivity—what he called a ‘summons’—is a condition of possibility of self-consciousness. This thesis is widely taken to be one of Fichte’s most influential contributions to the European philosophy of the last two centuries. But what the thesis actually states is far from obvious; and existing interpretations either are poorly supported by the texts or else render the thesis trivial or implausible. I propose a new interpretation, on which Fichte’s claim is that reflective (...) self-consciousness arises in the context of ad hoc efforts to coordinate action. (shrink)

This article examines the relevance of Hegel’s theory of recognition within educational theory and practice in relation to the development of a non-affirmative theory of education. The article argues that Hegel’s theory of recognition can serve as a fruitful starting point for articulating an educational theory that can contribute to the subject’s open-ended formation in modern society. To start with, the article surveys the connection between Hegel’s educational thought and his concept of recognition. Against this backdrop, the article singles out (...) how Hegel’s theory of recognition provides a compelling theory of intersubjectivity that calls attention to the role of norms in personal development and the construction of the social world. In continuation of a non-affirmative principle, it is argued that Hegelian recognition underlines, first, that the subject’s formation can fruitfully be an open-ended and dynamic process and, second, that in order to underpin this process it is necessary to critically assess norms and norm-generating practices within an educational context. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute la interpretación de Isaiah Berlin de la filosofía política fichteana en términos de un organicismo. Esta interpretación muestra que las libertades individuales juegan un rol fundamental en la educación de los ciudadanos futuros en tanto que ésta es una tarea realizada por los padres y no por el Estado. Sin embargo, Fichte no defiende una idea de la libertad individual como no-interferencia, aun cuando las similitudes entre su teoría y la de Humboldt sugieran lo contrario. (...) Del mismo modo, Fichte no defendió tampoco la idea de la libertad como no-dominación, como revela la comparación con la teoría de Philip Pettit. Por el contrario, Fichte sostuvo que la educación de los futuros ciudadanos tiene sentido únicamente cuando las libertades individuales son consideradas como inextricablemente unidas con la propiedad. This paper discusses Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation of Fichtean political philosophy in terms of organicism. It shows that individual liberties play a fundamental role in the education of future citizens as a task performed by parents, not the state. However, Fichte did not defend an idea of individual liberty or non-interference, even if similarities between his theory and Humboldt’s suggest the contrary. At the same time, Fichte also did not espouse the idea of freedom as non-domination, as a comparison with Philip Pettit’s theory reveals. By contrast, Fichte posited that the education of future citizens makes sense only if individual liberties are considered inextricably linked to property. (shrink)

La filosofía feuerbachiana supone un relevante paso en la superación de cierta tradición filosófica basada en categorías meramente especulativas y metafísicas, y ello a partir de una concepción ética y antropológica que enraíza directamente con la perspectiva del reconocimiento recíproco. No obstante, el peso que adquiere la dimensión afectiva en la propuesta ética de Feuerbach problematiza, de hecho, la posibilidad de considerar la perspectiva del reconocimiento como contenido normativo de la moral a la hora de formular pretensiones de universalidad. En (...) este sentido, el presente trabajo trata de reflexionar sobre la actualidad del pensamiento feuerbachiano a partir de la reconstrucción de dicha perspectiva recognoscente, teniendo en cuenta tanto sus límites como posibilidades. (shrink)

The ethical and political thinking of Axel Honneth—German philosopher and leading scholar in the third generation of Frankfurt School Critical Theorists—has garnered considerable attention since his seminal Struggle for Recognition. In his writings, Honneth seeks to demonstrate a new outlook for the relationship between the I, the Other, and We: a scheme in which the I and the Other would not be that of assimilation—but a peaceful We, while at the same time preserving their different value systems and identities. This (...) was done by way of a three-tiered model of mutual recognition for understanding societal relations. On the other hand, Honneth’s theory has been criticized by critics such as Fraser and Pensky as Eurocentric, the implied normative superiority of which renders Honneth’s ethical theory prone to the exclusion of the “other” which he so adamantly seeks to affirm. This paper examines the extent to whichHonneth’s response to such critiques liberates his theory from its purported exclusionary and unethical orientation. Neither side of the debate, however, seems to put forth a final formulation of the relationship between the I and the We. In this vein, this research proposes a concretized account of recognition, necessitating, in turn, an interculturaland dialogical approach to this theory. (shrink)