Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyré’s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although the view of Damerow et al. on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my (...) analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics. (shrink)

RésuméL’opuscule de Pascal Expériences nouvelles touchant le vide donne le schéma d’une démonstration physique visant à mettre un terme aux controverses entre plénistes et vacuistes. La forme traditionnelle de la dispute avec laquelle Pascal veut rompre se trouve cependant réactivée par Étienne Noël, qui reprend à son compte des objections plénistes que les Expériences nouvelles n’envisagent comme possibles que pour mieux les invalider. Les lettres de Pascal Au très révérend père Noël et À Monsieur Le Pailleur permettent au contraire de (...) délimiter un autre champ disputationnel que celui auquel Noël obéit. Pascal subordonne la dispute à la reconnaissance de principes épistémologiques communs: la discussion antithétique sur le vide doit être contrôlée par des critères méthodologiques acceptés par tous. Contre la figure de la dispute savante, Pascal définit ainsi un modèle radicalement nouveau: la dispute scientifique. (shrink)

This thesis studies the role of conceptual content in inference and reasoning. The first two chapters offer a theoretical and historical overview of the relation between inference and meaning in philosophy and psychology. In particular, a critical analysis of the formality thesis, i.e., the idea that rational inference is a rule-based and topic-neutral mechanism, is advanced. The origins of this idea in logic and its influence in philosophy and cognitive psychology are discussed. Chapter 3 consists of an analysis of the (...) relationship between inference and representation. It is argued that inference has to be studied from a pluralistic per- spective due to its dependence on different formats of representing information. The following four chapters apply conceptual spaces, a formal theory of concepts within cognitive semantics, to three concept-based inference-types. First, an explication of Sellars notion of material inference is advanced. Later, the model is extended to account for nonmonotonic inference by studying the role expectations in reasoning. Finally, a conceptual space-model of category-based induction is presented. This model predicts most of the empirical properties of this psychological phenomenon and subsumes some of the previous theories in psychology. It is stated that the explanatory fruitfulness of this new approach is evidence for the failure of the formality thesis and calls for a unified model of rational inference that puts semantics at center stage. The last chapter of the thesis discusses how inference and concepts interact in scientific reasoning, which makes constant use of hybrid symbolic structures for representing conceptual information. Stephen Toulmin’s notions of method of representation and inferential technique are developed and applied in a case study about the emergence of the notion of instantaneous speed during the passage from geometrical physics to analytical mechanics. It is claimed that this analysis provides support to the pluralistic perspective for theorizing about reasoning. (shrink)

Peter Dear ha proporcionado recientemente un análisis de la transformación que sufrió el recurso a la experiencia en la filosofía natural del siglo XVll. De la experiencia de lo cotidiano se pasa a la descripción detallada de una experiencia artificial irrepetible, localizada espacio-temporalmente y producida por instrumentos más o menos complejos. EI artículo explora dicha interpretación en referencia a la construcción de la ciencia del movimiento de Galileo, mediante un análisis dcl experimento del plano inclinado que se describe en los (...) Discorsi y un manuscrito, y concluye que la interpretacion de Dear dificulta considerablemente la caracterización de la práctica de Galileo.Peter Dear has recently put forward an analysis of th transformation underwent by the appeal to experience in Seventeenth-Century natural philosophy. According to Dear, this transformation lies in the change from common experience to the detailed description of an unrepeatable artificial experience space temporally located and produced by more or less sophisticated instruments. This paper explores Dear’s interpretation with regard to the construction of Galileo’s science of motion, by analyzing the celebrated inclined plane experiment described in the Discorsi as well as one of Galileo's manuscripts and concludes that Dear’s interpretation makes very difficult the characterization of Galileo’s practice. (shrink)

The conventional portrait of Thomas Hobbes that emerged in twentieth century histories of philosophy is that of the quintessential mechanical philosopher, who openly broke with philosophical tradition (together with René Descartes). Hobbes’s scholars depicted a more correct and detailed panorama, by analyzing Hobbes’s debt towards Aristotelian and Renaissance traditions, as well as the problematic nature of the epistemological status that Hobbes attributes to natural philosophy. However, Hobbes’s connection to modern Galilean science remains problematic. How and in what way did Hobbes (...) take inspiration from Galileo? In this article, I analyze Hobbes’s natural philosophy by addressing three topics: (1) his connection with some aspects of seventeenth-century Aristotelianism; (2) differences and analogies between Hobbes’s and Galileo’s epistemological approaches; and (3) the Galilean foundation of Hobbes’s philosophy. Through this analysis I want to show in which sense Hobbes can be properly defined a “Galilean philosopher”. (shrink)

This volume, The Brazilian Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, is the first attempt to present to a general audience, works from Brazil on this subject. The included papers are original, covering a remarkable number of relevant topics of philosophy of science, logic and on the history of science. The Brazilian community has increased in the last years in quantity and in quality of the works, most of them being published in respectable international journals on the subject. The (...) chapters of this volume are forwarded by a general introduction, which aims to sketch not only the contents of the chapters, but it is conceived as a historical and conceptual guide to the development of the field in Brazil. The introduction intends to be useful to the reader, and not only to the specialist, helping them to evaluate the increase in production of this country within the international context. (shrink)

In this article I am going to reconstruct Stephen Toulmin’s procedural theory of concepts and explanations in order to develop two overlooked ideas from his philosophy of science: methods of representations and inferential techniques. I argue that these notions, when properly articulated, could be useful for shedding some light on how scientific reasoning is related to representational structures, concepts, and explanation within scientific practices. I will explore and illustrate these ideas by studying the development of the notion of instantaneous speed (...) during the passage from Galileo’s geometrical physics to analytical mechanics. At the end, I will argue that methods of representations could be considered as constitutive of scientific inference; and I will show how these notions could connect with other similar ideas from contemporary philosophy of science like those of models and model-based reasoning. (shrink)

Résumé L’opuscule de Pascal _Expériences nouvelles touchant le vide_ donne le schéma d’une démonstration physique visant à mettre un terme aux controverses entre plénistes et vacuistes. La forme traditionnelle de la dispute avec laquelle Pascal veut rompre se trouve cependant réactivée par Étienne Noël, qui reprend à son compte des objections plénistes que les _Expériences nouvelles_ n’envisagent comme possibles que pour mieux les invalider. Les lettres de Pascal _Au très révérend père Noël_ et _À Monsieur Le Pailleur_ permettent au contraire (...) de délimiter un autre champ disputationnel que celui auquel Noël obéit. Pascal subordonne la dispute à la reconnaissance de principes épistémologiques communs: la discussion antithétique sur le vide doit être contrôlée par des critères méthodologiques acceptés par tous. Contre la figure de la dispute savante, Pascal définit ainsi un modèle radicalement nouveau: la dispute scientifique. (shrink)