Over the lifetime of Conversation Analysis (CA), scholars have discovered many systems of action organisation (machineries) describing how conversational turns occur, what actions are expected, and how intersubjectivity in conversation is maintained. However, when John Heritage proposed a new machinery that examines the knowledge orientation of participants in interactions, a debate broke out between conversation analysts in which Michael Lynch and his colleagues in radical ethnomethodology descend upon on epistemics. The controversy begins with Lynch accusing Heritage of cognitivism and the (...) extra-situational nature of epistemics, while research on ethnomethodology and conversation analysis has traditionally focused on situated action. The discussion of epistemics points to an internal tension in CA as to where the boundaries of situations lie and what, therefore, can be the focus of CA. This article reactualises the problem of situationality in CA by analysing the arguments in the debate on epistemics. The authors show that epistemics and the debates surrounding it constitute a serious test for CA, revealing a conceptual problem that has hitherto been obscured - the relation and potential hierarchy of different machineries. Turning to the origins of the concept of situationality in the writings of Goffman and Sacks, the authors demonstrate that for opposing sides, the localisation of phenomena within situations is an analytical decision about what can be seen in empirical data. In contrast, distinguishing between the position of the analyst and the participant in the interaction shifts the analyst's attention to how the machineries become relevant to the interactants, that is, how their omnirelevance is realised. The authors argue that this is a more productive formulation of the question than that of the boundaries of the situation. (shrink)

Although advice is routinely offered in ordinary conversation, commentators and analysts have treated it as a special or delicate type of action, noticing a number of challenges associated with both providing and receiving it. In this article, I first describe the most basic social-sequential context for giving advice and explicate how the formulations speakers use to offer advice are adapted to the distinct epistemic configurations that characterize that context. Drawing on Jefferson and Lee’s observations regarding ‘troubles tellings’, I argue that (...) speakers typically offer advice when a co-participant reports an insoluble trouble or problem to one who possess special knowledge about the domain of trouble. I show how this epistemic configuration constitutes a ‘home environment’ for advice-giving and discuss how speakers vary the design of their advice to adapt to the sequential environments that entail different epistemic configurations. Finally, I consider how alternative, contrasting responses to advice manage the epistemic framework set in motion by advice-giving. (shrink)

B-events are matters which are better known to listeners than to speakers. This paper studies the detectives’ use of B-event statements in two different environments in their interactions with suspects/witnesses. The first type of environment are relatively co-operative sequences during which the aim is the reconstruction of events and constructing the record; here, B-event statements are realised as confirmation seeking questions. The second type of environment, a hostile interactional environment, is composed of argumentative sequences in which detectives aim to determine (...) who are the perpetrators of crimes; in these sequences, the detectives’ B-event statements are realised as accusations. While performing the two activities, the detectives signal different epistemic levels and stances at the turn level. Thus, the former B-event statements are mostly epistemically downgraded, while the latter are mostly upgraded, in order to facilitate undertaking these different activities during police questioning. (shrink)