The present is a moment of crisis and transition, both generally and specifically in “knowledge” and its institutions. Acknowledging this elicits the key questions: where are we? Where are we headed? What, if anything, can be done about this? And what can the “economics of science” contribute to this? This paper assumes a “cultural political economy of research & innovation” perspective to explore the current upheaval and transition in the system of academic knowledge production, at the confluence of accelerating commercialisation (...) and the seemingly opposing movement of “open science.” This perspective affords a characterisation of the core of the current crises as a crisis of moral economy; an issue to which a political economy of epistemic authority is in turn crucial. A “remoralizing” of knowledge production is thus a matter of key systemic importance, though it is important to understand such developments in power-strategic, and not explicitly moral, terms. Much of the current moves towards “open science” and “massively open online courses” can also then be seen as self-defeating developments that simply exacerbate the crisis of a viable “economy of science” and in no sense its solution. Their lasting significance, however, is more likely to lie precisely in their effects on the construction of a new moral economy of knowledge production. (shrink)

This article explores Adorno’s negative dialectics as a critical social theory of economic objectivity. It rejects the conventional view that Adorno does not offer a critique of the economic forms of capitalist society. The article holds that negative dialectics is a dialectics of the social world in the form of the economic object, one that is governed by the movement of economic quantities, that is, real economic abstractions. Negative dialectics refuses to accept the constituted economic categories as categories of economic (...) nature. Instead, the article argues, it amounts to a conceptualized social praxis [ begriffene Praxis] of the capitalistically constituted social relations, which manifest themselves in the form of seemingly independent economic categories. Economic nature is a socially constituted nature, which entails the class antagonism in its concept. The article concludes that for negative dialectics the explanation of real economic abstractions lies in the understanding of the class-divided nature of human practice. (shrink)

This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. (...) On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, we should move away from propounding a theory of action, and instead focus on a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational, towards a co-actional, model of action. (shrink)

Economics has long been the ‘dismal science’. The crisis in classical political economy at the end of the nineteenth century produced radically differing intellectual responses: Marx’s reconstitution of value theory on the basis of his dialectical method, the marginalists’ development of subjective value theory, and the historical school’s advocacy of inductive and historical reasoning. It is against this background that economics was established as a discrete academic discipline, consciously modelling itself on maths and physics and developing its focus on theorising (...) exchange. This entailed extraordinary reductionism, with humans regarded as rational, self-interested actors, and class, society, history and ‘the social’ being excised from economic analysis. On the basis of this narrowing of its concerns, particularly from the 1980s onwards, economics has sought to expand its sphere of influence through a form of imperialism which seeks to apply mainstream economic approaches to other social sciences and sees economics as ‘the universal grammar of social science’. The implications of this shift are discussed in Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis’s two volumes, where they analyse the fate of the social, the political and the historical in economic thought, and assess the future for an inter-disciplinary critique of economic reason. (shrink)

Jos yhteiskuntatieteilijöitä on uskominen, yhteiskuntatieteet ovat aina kriisissä, mutta onneksi kulloisellakin puhujalla on tarjottavanaan ratkaisun avaimet. Tämä artikkeli noudattaa tuota hyväksi havaittua kaavaa. Se lähtee liikkeelle Immanuel Wallersteinin 1990-luvun lopussa käynnistämästä yhteiskuntatieteiden fragmentoituneisuuskeskustelusta ja tarkastelee sen jälkeen ensin Wallersteinin omia ja sitten Michael Mannin historiallisen sosiologian kriisiin tarjoamia ratkaisuesityksiä. Edellisiä voidaan pitää ongelmallisina ja jälkimmäistä kaikesta laaja-alaisuudestaan huolimatta liian kapeana aikakautemme polttavimpien ongelmien analyysiin. Siksi käsittelenkin seuraavaksi Mannin ideologisiin, taloudellisiin, sotilaallisiin ja poliittisiin valtalähteisiin keskittyvän ns. IEMP-mallin laajentamista vieläkin kattavammaksi tutkimusohjelmaksi, (...) joka tiivistyy ns. NACEVP-malliksi. Kirjaimet mallin lyhenteessä viittavat naturaaliseen, artefaktuaaliseen, kulttuuriseen, taloudelliseen, väkivaltaan liittyvään ja poliittiseen valtaan. Lopuksi elaboroin mallin käyttöä tutkimuksessa analysoimalla sen avulla populismin viimeaikaista nousua OECD-maissa, ja aivan viimeiseksi teen yhteenvedon. (shrink)