Many theorists maintain that perceptual experience exhibits the what is often called the phenomenology of particularity: that in perceptual experience it phenomenally seems that there are particular things. Some urge that this phenomenology demands special accounts of perception on which particulars somehow constitute perceptual experience, including versions of relationalism, on which perception is a relation between perceivers and particular perceived objects, or complex forms of representationalism, on which perception exhibits demonstrative or special particular-involving types of content. I argue here that (...) no such account required. I develop and defend a novel account of such phenomenology, grounded in the higher-order theory of consciousness. In short, this view holds that the phenomenology of particularity arises because suitable higher-order states make it appear to one that one is in perceptual relations to particulars, even if perception is not in any way constituted by particulars. I argue that this account has many advantages and avoids problems that other theories of such phenomenology face. (shrink)

There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracch...

Analysing ancient art offers views into the visual worlds of its makers. The cusps and swirls typical of European Celtic Art have been interpreted as abstractions of faces and creatures inspired by earlier, more naturalistic art. Yet as 21st-century visual communicators used to ‘reading’ abstract emoji, we may be over-interpreting this aspect at the cost of other, still hidden dimensions. While humans share inalienable universals across space and culture, such as recognizing friendly or hostile faces, persons who lack facial recognition (...) are diagnosed with autistic spectrum condition. However, their condition enables them to recognize embedded figures easily within crowded images or to focus on pattern instead of faces. My initial assessment indicates that some imagery of European Celtic Art would be compatible with an autistic idiom, similar as suggested for Palaeolithic art. This paper investigates these different ways of seeing European Celtic Art and opens new pathways for future research. (shrink)