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  1. The return of concept empiricism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...)
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  • Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):1-11.
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  • Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?Guido Löhr - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2171-2191.
    I discuss Edouard Machery’s claim that philosophers and psychologists when using the term ‘concept’ are really theorizing about different things. This view is not new, but it has never been developed or defended in detail. Once spelled out, we can see that Machery is right that the psychological literature uses a different notion of concept. However, Machery fails to acknowledge that the two notions are not only compatible but complementary. This fits more with the traditional view according to which philosophers (...)
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  • Associationist Theories of Thought.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • On the advantage (if any) and disadvantage of the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction for cognitive science.Alessandro Dell’Anna & Marcello Frixione - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):29-45.
    In this article we question the utility of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in cognitive science, and in particular, in the empirical study of visual perception. First, we individuate some difficulties in characterizing the notion of “concept” itself both in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Then we stress the heterogeneous nature of the notion of nonconceptual content and outline the complex and ambiguous relations that exist between the conceptual/nonconceptual duality and other pairs of notions, such as (...)
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