Existing accounts of public-goods distribution rely on the existence of solidarity for providing non-universal public goods, such as the humanities or national parks. There are three fundamental problems with these accounts: they ignore instances of social fragmentation; they treat preferences for public goods as morally benign, and they assume that these preferences are the only relevant moral consideration. However, not all citizens unanimously require public goods such as the humanities or national parks. Public-goods distribution that is based only on citizens’ (...) preferences, therefore, means that non-universal public good are at a constant risk of under-provision, and has negative implications for human flourishing. The paper, therefore, develops a complementary justification for the distribution of public goods, that decouples the distribution of public goods from ad hoc preferences, and grounds the distributive justification in the intrinsic value of these goods. There are three reasons to include intrinsic-value considerations in public-goods distribution: responding to crowding-out effects; promoting shared heritage and cross-fertilization. Finally, the intrinsic-value justification may indirectly promote solidarity. Thus, the intrinsic-value and the solidarity justifications need not be mutually exclusive, rather they can be mutually reinforcing. (shrink)

I critically examine a common liberal egalitarian view about the justification for, and proper content of, mandatory health insurance. This view holds that a mandate is justified because it is the best way to ensure that those in poor health gain health insurance on equitable terms. It also holds that a government should mandate what a representative prudent individual would purchase for themselves if they were placed in fair conditions of choice. I argue that this common justification for a mandate (...) is incomplete. A further reason for mandated insurance is that it helps secure social egalitarian public goods that would be underprovided if insurance were optional. I also argue that rather than mandating what a representative individual would choose for themselves, we should design the mandatory package by appealing to a pluralistic egalitarian view, which cares about improving people’s well-being, reducing unfair inequality, and maintaining egalitarian social relations. (shrink)

When is state coercion for the provision of public goods justified? And how should the social surplus of public goods be distributed? Philosophers approach these questions by distinguishing between essential and discretionary public goods. This article explains the intractability of this distinction, and presents two upshots. First, if governments provide configurations of public goods that simultaneously serve essential and discretionary purposes, the scope for justifiable complaints by honest holdouts is narrower than commonly assumed. Second, however, claims to distributive fairness in (...) the provision of public goods also turn out to be more complex to assess. (shrink)

El artículo revisa los argumentos a favor y en contra de que el público financie directa y voluntariamente la actividad cultural. Se parte de que los mecanismos de financiación elegidos por las políticas culturales tienen una dimensión ética y no solo una finalidad instrumental. Utilizando el enfoque comparativo propuesto por A. Sen, se investiga si el micro-mecenazgo y otras formas de inversión por parte de los consumidores culturales constituyen formas de mecenazgo ciudadano valiosas desde un punto de vista ético. A (...) pesar de que las políticas culturales a favor del micro-mecenazgo pueden ser acusadas de paternalistas o de mercantilizar la vida cultural, se defiende que el mecenazgo ciudadano es una innovación social que fomenta la responsabilidad social de los consumidores culturales. En tal sentido las políticas culturales deben tener en cuenta que el comportamiento privado de consumo e inversión también es una forma de participación en la vida social. (shrink)