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  1. Balancing Patient and Societal Interests in Decisions About Potentially Life-Sustaining Treatment: An Australian Policy Analysis.Eliana Close, Ben P. White & Lindy Willmott - 2020 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17 (3):407-421.
    BackgroundThis paper investigates the content of Australian policies that address withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment to analyse the guidance they provide to doctors about the allocation of resources.MethodsAll publicly available non-institutional policies on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment were identified, including codes of conduct and government and professional organization guidelines. The policies that referred to resource allocation were isolated and analysed using qualitative thematic analysis. Eight Australian policies addressed both withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and resource allocation.ResultsFour resource-related themes were (...)
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  • Children, futility and parental disagreement: The importance of ethical reasoning for clinicians in the paediatric intensive care setting.Chiara Baiocchi & Edmund Horowicz - 2023 - Clinical Ethics 18 (1):26-35.
    The provision of intensive care enables the lives of neonates, infants and children to be sustained or extended in circumstances previously regarded as impossible. However, as well as benefits, such care may confer burdens that resultingly frame continuation of certain interventions as futile, conferring more harm than or any, benefit. Subsequently, clinicians and families in the paediatric intensive care unit are often faced with decisions to withdraw, withhold or limit intensive care in order to act in the best interests of (...)
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  • Humility.John McMillan - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (4):227-228.
    Hume criticised ‘humility’ as a ‘monkish virtue’ and objected to it on the basis that such virtues ‘stupefy the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper.’1 Despite the appeal of Hume’s plea for less restraint and self-denial, other thinkers such as Kant consider epistemic humility to be fundamental, given the limits of our rationality and our struggle to know and do the right thing.2 By epistemic humility, he did not mean weakness or being self-effacing, instead (...)
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