Drawing on work by philosophers CAJ Coady and David Coady on the epistemology of rumours, I develop a theory which exploits the distinction between rumouring and rumour-mongering for the purpose of explaining why we should treat rumours as a species of justified belief. -/- Whilst it is true that rumour-mongering, the act of passing on a rumour maliciously, presents a pathology of the normally reliable transmission of rumours, I will argue that rumours themselves have a generally reliable transmission process, that (...) of rumouring, and should be considered to be examples of warranted beliefs. -/- My argument will also touch on the association of rumours with another class of beliefs that are usually considered to be suspect, conspiracy theories. I will argue that whilst rumours are reliable (as a mechanism for the transmission of justified beliefs) the analysis of the transmission of conspiracy theories requires us to realise they are different to rumours in some important respects. (shrink)

Alvin Goldman has criticized the idea that, when evaluating the opinions of experts who disagree, a novice should “go by the numbers”. Although Goldman is right that this is often a bad idea, his argument involves an appeal to a principle, which I call the non-independence principle, which is not in general true. Goldman's formal argument for this principle depends on an illegitimate assumption, and the examples he uses to make it seem intuitively plausible are not convincing. The failure of (...) this principle has significant implications, not only for the issue Goldman is directly addressing, but also for the epistemology of rumors, and for our understanding of the value of epistemic independence. I conclude by using the economics literature on information cascades to highlight an important truth which Goldman's principle gestures toward, and by mounting a qualified defense of the practice of going by the numbers. (shrink)

Purpose While psychology, sociology and communications studies hypothesise a range of independent variables that might impact on individuals’ acceptance or rejection of rumours, almost all studies of the phenomenon have taken place in environments featuring notable, and sometimes very deep, partisan divisions, making it almost impossible to isolate the impact of partisan influences on views on different rumour subjects. This study aims to remove the possibility of partisan influences on readers of internet rumours by testing the impact of independent demographic (...) variables in China, a one-party state with no overt partisan divisions. The study provides an opportunity to strip away the influence of ideology and see whether this factor may have coloured previous studies on susceptibility to believe rumours. Design/methodology/approach An empirical study was used to examine belief in false and true online rumours in a non-partisan environment. A large sample group was presented with rumours across four subject areas and respondents’ conclusions and demographic information was then subject to logistic regression analysis to identify relationships between factors and ability to identify the veracity of online rumours. Findings Unexpectedly, the regression analysis revealed no statistically significant nexus between many independent demographic variables and patterns of believing or disbelieving rumours. In other cases, a statistically significant relationship was revealed, but only to a limited degree. The results suggest that once the role of partisanship in explaining the proliferation of and belief in false rumours and the ability to identify true ones is removed from consideration, no other independent variables enjoy convincing links with rumour belief. Originality/value The study tests in China, a jurisdiction featuring a non-partisan environment, the impact of independent variables on media users’ belief in a wide range of rumours. (shrink)

Rumors, for better or worse, are an important element of public discourse. The present paper focuses on rumors as an epistemic phenomenon rather than as a social or political problem. In particular, it investigates the relation between the mode of transmission and the reliability, if any, of rumors as a source of knowledge. It does so by comparing rumor with two forms of epistemic dependence that have recently received attention in the philosophical literature: our dependence on the testimony of others, (...) and our dependence on what has been called the ‘coverage-reliability’ of our social environment (Goldberg 2010). According to the latter, an environment is ‘coverage-reliable’ if, across a wide range of beliefs and given certain conditions, it supports the following conditional: If ~p were true I would have heard about it by now. However, in information-deprived social environments with little coverage-reliability, rumors may transmit information that could not otherwise be had. This suggests that a trade-off exists between levels of trust in the coverage-reliability of official sources and (warranted) trust in rumor as a source of information. (shrink)

Neste ensaio, eu analisarei criticamente três definições de boato. Na primeira seção, eu considerarei a explicação de C. A. J. Coady, na qual o boato é um caso de testemunho aparente, mas não é um caso de testemunho genuíno. Na segunda seção, eu considerarei a definição de boato oferecida por David Coady, na qual o boato se espalha em uma larga cadeia sem status oficial. Na terceira seção, eu considerarei a definição de boato de Axel Gelfert, na qual o boato (...) não tem corroboração independente de evidência de primeira mão ou de fonte oficial. Na quarta e última seção, eu proporei uma definição, na qual o boato é um caso de testemunho genuíno sem confirmação oficial, cuja fonte original foi perdida ou nunca existiu. (shrink)

Previous philosophical work on distrust in science has argued that understanding public distrust in science and scientific interventions requires that we pay careful attention not only to epistemic considerations (that is, beliefs about science), but also to values, and the emotional contexts in which assessments of scientific credibility are made. This is likely to be a truncated list of relevant factors for understanding trust/distrust, but these are certainly key areas of concern. The aim of this paper is not to further (...) innumerate the list of relevant factors. Rather, it is to map the ways that these key areas (beliefs, values, and emotions) are related to each other. These are not distinct categories, but rather they interact, making our picture of distrust more complicated than we might otherwise imagine. This discussion will take place in the context of resistance to medical interventions. Notably, Ebola interventions in West Africa, HIV/AIDS testing in South Africa, and vaccines across the world. (shrink)