It is shown that two formally consistent type-free second-order systems, due to Cocchiarella, and based on the notion of homogeneous stratification, are subject to a contingent version of Russell's paradox.

We present a relative consistency proof for second order systemRRC* and for certain important extensions of this system. The proof proceeds as follows: we prove first the equiconsistency of the strongest of such extensions (viz., systemH RRC*+(/CP**)) with second order systemT * . Now, N. Cocchiarella has shown thatT * is relatively consistent to systemT*+Ext; clearly, it follows thatH RRC*+(/CP**) is relatively consistent toT*+E xt. As an immediate consequence, the relative consistency ofRRC* and the other extensions also follows, being all (...) of them subsystems ofH RRC*+(/CP**). (shrink)

Theories about the ontological structure of the world have generally been described in informal, intuitive terms. This book offers an account of the general features and methodology of formal ontology. The book defends conceptual realism as the best system to adopt based on a logic of natural kinds. By formally reconstructing an intuitive, informal ontological scheme as a formal ontology we can better determine the consistency and adequacy of that scheme.

We develop a set-theoretic semantics for Cocchiarella's second-order logical system . Such a semantics is a modification of the nonstandard sort of second-order semantics described, firstly, by Simms and later extended by Cocchiarella. We formulate a new second order logical system and prove its relative consistency. We call such a system and construct its set-theoretic semantics. Finally, we prove completeness theorems for proper normal extensions of the two systems with respect to certain notions of validity provided by the semantics.

The problematic features of Quine's set theories NF and ML are a result of his replacing the higher-order predicate logic of type theory by a first-order logic of membership, and can be resolved by returning to a second-order logic of predication with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. We adopt a modified Fregean position called conceptual realism in which the concepts (unsaturated cognitive structures) that predicates stand for are distinguished from the extensions (or intensions) that their nominalizations denote as singular (...) terms. We argue against Quine's view that predicate quantifiers can be given a referential interpretation only if the entities predicates stand for on such an interpretation are the same as the classes (assuming extensionality) that nominalized predicates denote as singular terms. Quine's alternative of giving predicate quantifiers only a substitutional interpretation is compared with a constructive version of conceptual realism, which with a logic of nominalized predicates is compared with Quine's description of conceptualism as a ramified theory of classes. We argue against Quine's implicit assumption that conceptualism cannot account for impredicative concept-formation and compare holistic conceptual realism with Quine's class Platonism. (shrink)