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  1. Aristotle on the Beginning of Animal Life and Soul Activities.Anna Schriefl & Mor Segev - 2023 - Apeiron 56 (3):587-619.
    For Aristotle, animals, by contrast to plants, possess a perceptual soul. However, there is disagreement concerning the point at which the perceptual soul is acquired, for him. On one influential interpretation, Aristotle thinks that the perceptual soul is acquired not during the initial formation of the embryo, but at some later stage of its development. On such interpretations of Aristotle’s view, the newly formed embryo is not yet an actual animal, but a plant-like living being or even inanimate matter. We (...)
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  • Potentially Human? Aquinas on Aristotle on Human Generation.José Filipe Silva - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):3-21.
    Thomas Aquinas describes embryological development as a succession of vital principles, souls, or substantial forms of which the last places the developing being in its own species. In the case of human beings this form is the rational soul. Aquinas' well-known commitment to the view that there is only one substantial form for each composite and that a substantial form directly informs prime matter leads to the conclusion that the succession of soul kinds is non-cumulative. The problem is that this (...)
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  • Commentary on Miller.Victor Caston - 1999 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 15 (1):214-230.
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  • ‘What’s Teleology Got To Do With It?’ A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Generation of Animals V.Mariska Leunissen & Allan Gotthelf - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (4):325-356.
    Despite the renewed interest in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals in recent years, the subject matter of GA V, its preferred mode(s) of explanation, and its place in the treatise as a whole remain misunderstood. Scholars focus on GA I-IV, which explain animal generation in terms of efficient-final causation, but dismiss GA V as a mere appendix, thinking it to concern (a) individual, accidental differences among animals, which are (b) purely materially necessitated, and (c) are only tangentially related to the topics (...)
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  • The Argument from Potentiality in the Embryo Protection Debate: Finally “Depotentialized”?Marco Stier & Bettina Schoene-Seifert - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):19-27.
    Debates on the moral status of human embryos have been highly and continuously controversial. For many, these controversies have turned into a fruitless scholastical endeavor. However, recent developments and insights in cellular biology have cast further doubt on one of the core points of dissent: the argument from potentiality. In this article we want to show in a nonscholastical way why this argument cannot possibly survive. Getting once more into the intricacies of status debates is a must in our eyes. (...)
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  • Entre peripatos et kepos.Giulia Scalas - 2019 - Philosophie Antique 19:85-115.
    L’objectif de cette étude est d’examiner l’hypothèse selon laquelle la quarta natura, théorisée par Épicure pour rendre compte des activités de l’âme et décrite par Lucrèce (DRN III, 237-244), résulte de l’appropriation par Épicure d’un argument aristotélicien afin de répondre aux critiques d’Aristote à l’égard de la théorie démocritéenne de l’âme. Pour ce faire, on analysera le témoignage de Cicéron (Tusc. I, 10, 22) sur le quintum genus attribué à Aristote et on rendra compte des débats sur ses sources possibles. (...)
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  • ἡ κίνησις τῆς τέχνης: Crafts and Souls as Principles of Change.Patricio A. Fernandez & Jorge Mittelmann - 2017 - Phronesis 62 (2):136-169.
    Aristotle’s soul is a first principle (an ‘efficient cause’) of every vital change in an animal, in the way that a craft is a cause of its product’s coming-to-be. We argue that the soul’s causal efficacy cannot therefore be reduced to the formal constitution of vital phenomena, or to discrete interventions into independently constituted processes, but involves the exercise of vital powers. This reading does better justice to Aristotle’s conception of craft as a rational productive disposition; and it captures the (...)
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