Much of the human enhancement literature focuses on the ethical, social, and political challenges we are likely to face in the future. I will focus instead on whether we can make decisions to modify ourselves that are known to be likely to satisfy our preferences. It seems plausible to suppose that, if a subject is deciding whether to select a reasonably safe and morally unproblematic enhancement, the decision will be an easy one. The subject will simply figure out her preferences (...) and decide accordingly. The problem, however, is that there is substantial evidence that we are not very good at predicting what will satisfy our preferences. This is a general problem that applies to many different types of decisions, but I argue that there are additional complications when it comes to making decisions about enhancing ourselves. These arise not only for people interested in selecting enhancements but also for people who choose to abstain. (shrink)

The covid-19 pandemic has revealed a partially forgotten vulnerability. This very hostile period has made us more aware of the finitude of our life as well as the dangers to which we are exposed as the biological organisms that we are. Faced with such a panorama, transhumanism has taken advantage of this situation to claim, more forcefully than ever, the benefits that the application of technologies on human beings could have. Yet, at the same time, opponents of this movement have (...) pointed out, with equal intensity, how the pandemic has wakened many of its promises. We show how both the former and the latter continue to hold radically different positions regarding how to address vulnerability. However, both have seen the pandemic as an opportunity to highlight what should be the right direction for the future of our species. This event, which is not rooted in the field of science-fiction, could be decisive in rethinking the great challenges that await us. (shrink)

I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity;” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body; brain; and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing reserve.” Under transhumanism; the body is enframed as an external; technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that (...) might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further; I argue that; by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable; we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby; Daniel Sarewitz; and Andy Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden when the essence of technology is not uncovered in a primordial way. I argue that by threatening to obscure death as a foundational possibility for Dasein; transhumanism poses the danger of hiding the need to develop a free and authentic relation to technology; Truth; and ultimately to Dasein itself. (shrink)