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Kant on Epistemic Autonomy

In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 687-696 (2021)

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  1. Room for responsibility: Kant on direct doxastic voluntarism.Christopher Benzenberg - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Kant's theory of assent seems to combine two incompatible claims that (i) we are responsible for our assent and (ii) we have no direct voluntary control over our assent. But how can we be responsible for something over which we have no direct voluntary control? Scholars have tried to resolve this tension by arguing that, according to Kant, assent is under our indirect voluntary or intellectual control. This paper defends a different solution. It is argued that contrary to first impressions, (...)
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  • On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.
    Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This volume shows: how and (...)
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  • Kant on doxastic agency, its scope, and the demands of its exercise.Alix Cohen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    After showing that there is room in Kant’s account for doxastic responsibility, this paper sets out to explore the form it takes as well as the demands it makes on doxastic agents. To do so, I begin by showing that Kant’s account of cognition allows for an indirect form of doxastic voluntarism that pertains to the will’s capacity to influence the exercise of our cognitive faculties. I then argue that it would be a mistake to conclude on this basis that (...)
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