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  1. Aristotle on Non-substantial Particulars, Fundamentality, and Change.Keren Wilson Shatalov - 2024 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106 (4):723-753.
    There is a debate about whether particular properties are for Aristotle non-recurrent and trope-like individuals or recurrent universals. I argue that Physics I.7 provides evidence that he took non-substantial particulars to be neither; they are instead non-recurrent modes. Physics I.7 also helps show why this matters. Particular properties must be individual modes in order for Aristotle to preserve three key philosophical commitments: that objects of ordinary experience are primary substances, that primary substances undergo genuine change, and that primary substances are (...)
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  • Qualification in Philosophy.Boris Hennig - 2023 - Acta Analytica 39 (1):183-205.
    Qualifiers such as “insofar as” and “in itself” have always been important ingredients in key philosophical claims. Descartes, for instance, famously argues that insofar as he is a thinker, he is not made of matter, and Kant equally famously argues that we cannot know things in themselves. Neither of these claims is meant to be true without qualification. Descartes is not simply denying that humans consist of matter, and Kant is not simply denying that we know things. Therefore, we cannot (...)
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  • Aristotle on Accidental Causation.Tyler Huismann - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (4):561-575.
    I offer a new analysis of Aristotle's concept of an accidental cause. Using passages fromMetaphysics Δ and Ε, as well as Physics II, I argue that accidental causes are causally inert. After defending this reading against some objections, I draw some conclusions about Aristotle's basic understanding of causation.
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  • Epicurus on Truth and Falsehood.Alexander Bown - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):463–503.
    Sextus Empiricus ascribes to Epicurus a curious account of truth and falsehood, according to which these characteristics belong to things in the world about which one speaks, not to what one says about them. I propose an interpretation that takes this account seriously and explains the connection between truth and existence that the Epicureans also seem to recognise. I then examine a second Epicurean account of truth and falsehood and show how it is related to the first.
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  • Plenitude, Coincidence, and Humility.Maegan Fairchild - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):59-77.
    Fairchild (2019) advertised the humility of material plenitude, arguing that despite the profligate ontology of coincident objects it entails, the best version of plenitude is one that takes no stand on a range of nearby questions about modality and coincidence. Roughly, the thought is that plenitude says only that there are coincident objects corresponding to every consistent pattern of essential and accidental properties. Plenitude says (or should say) nothing about which patterns those might be, and so should be compatible with (...)
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  • Quiddities and repeatables: towards a tripartite analysis of simple predicative statements.Boris Hennig - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-12.
    I argue that a tripartite analysis of simple statements such as “Bucephalus is a horse”, according to which they divide into two terms and a copula, requires the notion of a repeatable: something such that more than one particular can literally be it. I pose a familiar dilemma with respect to repeatables, and turn to Avicenna for a solution, who discusses a similar dilemma concerning quiddities. I conclude by describing how Avicenna’s quiddities relate to repeatables, and how both quiddities and (...)
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  • The Texture of Aristotle’s Ontology.Tyler Huismann - 2022 - Apeiron 55 (4):557-586.
    Typically, Aristotle’s notion of an accidental unity is explained using our concept of identity, but doing so is fraught and liable to mislead. I argue that we should explain accidental unities in terms of sameness: doing so not only shows a coherence among texts thought to be in tension with one another, it reconciles the two competing conceptions of accidental unities in a satisfying way. I conclude by answering several Boolean questions that naturally arise in response to the inclusion of (...)
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  • Hylomorphism and the Priority Principle.Jeremy Skrzypek - 2017 - Metaphysica 18 (2):207-229.
    According to Jeffrey Brower’s hylomorphic account of material substances, prime matter and substantial forms together compose material substances, and material substances and accidental forms together compose accidental unities. In a recent article, Andrew Bailey has argued that Brower’s account has the counter-intuitive implication that no human person is ever the primary possessor, the primary thinker, of her own thoughts. In this paper, I consider various ways in which Brower might reply to this objection. I first consider several “invariant strategies”, solutions (...)
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  • A New Puzzle About Aristotelian Accidents.Tyler Huismann - 2021 - Metaphysics 4 (1):1-17.
    Aristotle gives a surprisingly broad menu of examples of something being accidental to something else. But the breadth of these examples seems to threaten a basic feature of accidentality, namely its asymmetry. ‘Accident’ has different senses, and one might think that that fact offers a way out, but some examples resist such an understanding. The best way forward, I argue, is to take accidentality to be contextual: relative to some context or condition, something might be accidental to something else; relative (...)
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  • Polarity and Inseparability: The Foundation of the Apodictic Portion of Aristotle's Modal Logic.Dwayne Raymond - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (3):193-218.
    Modern logicians have sought to unlock the modal secrets of Aristotle's Syllogistic by assuming a version of essentialism and treating it as a primitive within the semantics. These attempts ultimately distort Aristotle's ontology. None of these approaches make full use of tests found throughout Aristotle's corpus and ancient Greek philosophy. I base a system on Aristotle's tests for things that can never combine (polarity) and things that can never separate (inseparability). The resulting system not only reproduces Aristotle's recorded results for (...)
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  • Aristotle on the Objects of Natural and Mathematical Sciences.Joshua Mendelsohn - 2023 - Ancient Philosophy Today 5 (2):98-122.
    In a series of recent papers, Emily Katz has argued that on Aristotle's view mathematical sciences are in an important respect no different from most natural sciences: They study sensible substances, but not qua sensible. In this paper, I argue that this is only half the story. Mathematical sciences are distinctive for Aristotle in that they study things ‘from’, ‘through’ or ‘in’ abstraction, whereas natural sciences study things ‘like the snub’. What this means, I argue, is that natural sciences must (...)
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  • The Classic Inherence Theory of Attributes: Its Theses and Their Errors.D. W. Mertz - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):495-516.
    Primary to both ontology and epistemology is the attributional union that properties and relations have with their subjects. Yet, the tradition’s understanding of attribution has been assessed as shallow, and its contemporary analysis deemed locked in a non-progressing stalemate. Central here is the historically dominant __in___herence_/_constituent_ construal of attribution, what, I argue, has remained obscure and unattended as to its background assumptions and their implications. On the analysis offered herein, I make precise and detail errors of the defining assumptions of (...)
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  • No explanation of persons, no explanation of resurrection: on Lynne Baker’s constitution view and the resurrection of human persons.James T. Turner - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (3):297-317.
    I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ ], each (...)
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  • The man without properties.Boris Hennig - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    Contemporary philosophical logic rests on a distinction between things and properties. Properties are thought to differ from things in that their proper expression is incomplete or unsaturated. In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle did not distinguish between things and properties in this way. I will show, first, that Aristotle’s essences are not properties, and that certain passages in Aristotle make sense only if we do not take accidents to be properties either. The notion of a property is thus (...)
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  • Lichtenberg’s Point.Boris Hennig - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):265-286.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 265 - 286 The author argues that when Lichtenberg recommends saying “It is thinking” instead of “I am thinking”, he is not suggesting that thought might be a subjectless occurrence. Lichtenberg’s point is, rather, that we are often the _passive_ subject or medium of our thoughts. The author further argues that Descartes’ _cogito_ argument is not affected by this point, because Descartes does not claim that we must be the active subject of all (...)
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